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THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION IN CIVIL COMMITMENT
PROCEEDINGS*
MARIANNE WESSON**

I.

INTRODUCTION

When a state seeks the involuntary confinement of a person
claimed to suffer from mental illness, it must provide that person with the opportunity to litigate the propriety of the commitment before a judge or other impartial tribunal.' The state must
carry the burden of persuasion at the hearing2 and the respondent' is entitled to certain procedural protections, such as the
right to counsel.4 Although the civil commitment hearing was at
one time often perfunctory, it has become increasingly adversary' as mental health lawyers have taken more seriously their
* The generous support of the Samuel E. Ziegler Educational Fund contributed to
the research and writing of this article. In addition, the suggestions and criticisms of
Albert W. Alachuler and Arthur H. Travers were extremely helpful.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado. A.B. 1970 Vassar College;
J.D. 1973 University of Texas.
1. The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418 (1979), seems to imply a right to a hearing prior to an extended term of confinement for mental illness, although the decision did not address that particular question.
Most courts and commentators assume that a statute authorizing confinement of an unconsenting adult for other than a brief emergency period without affording a right to
hearing would be unconstitutional. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); cf.
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). No state permits commitment unless a hearing is
available. Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HAsv. L. Rav. 1190, 1279 n.97
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Civil Commitment].
2. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-33 (1979).
3. Throughout this article, I will refer to an individual who faces involuntary confinement for mental illness as a "respondent," even though such a person may not become the subject of formal commitment proceedings until some time after the extent of
the privilege against self-incrimination becomes an issue. I will use the terms "mental
health proceeding" and "civil commitment proceeding" interchangeably.
4. Although the Court has not squarely so held in the context of civil commitment,
almost all courts assume that there is a right to appointed counsel for the indigent and
almost all mental health statutes so provide. See Civil Commitment, supra note 1, at
1283-91; cf. Vitek v. Jones, 100 S. Ct. 1254 (1980) (plurality opinion) (right to counsel for
prisoner facing transfer to mental health institution); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605
(1967).
5. For a helpful survey of state laws governing the procedural and substantive aspects of civil commitment, see 3 MENrAL DisimrrY L. REP. 205-14 (1979) and AMERCAN
BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DisAmLmD AND THE LAw 66-132 (rev. ed. S. Brakel & R.
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advocacy role" and have argued more frequently for constitutional protections analogous to those of the criminal justice
7

system.

One who attends, or reads accounts of, many civil commitment proceedings will be struck by the extent to which the evidence presented at the hearings commonly has a single
source-the respondent. The state's principal witness is almost
always a psychiatrist or other mental health professional s who
has examined the respondent, frequently while he or she was involuntarily in the examiner's custody. 9 The state may also present, either directly or as a basis for the examiner's testimony,
observations of the respondent made by nursing siaff, aides,
clinical psychologists, and even custodial personnel. The perceptions of these individuals are often available only because the
state has used its coercive powers to require the respondent to
submit to observation.
Rock 1971) (hereinafter cited as Brakel & Rock).
6. An article that has been enormously influential in convincing attorneys for
mental health respondents that their responsibilities extend beyond acting as a "guardian" for their clients is Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of
the Mentally 11, 44 TEx. L. Rav. 424 (1966). Some courts have held that a "guardiantype" legal representative does not satisfy the constitutional right to counsel, see, e.g.,
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1097, 1099 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S.
473 (1974); Quesnell v. State, 517 P.2d 568 (Wash. 1973). See also Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and
a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43 (1974); Brakel, The Role of the Lawyer in the Mental
Health Field, 1977 Am. B. FOUNDATION RaS. J. 467; Litwack, The Role of Counsel in
Civil Commitment Proceedings:Emerging Problems, 62 CAL. L. REv. 816 (1974).
7. A case in which lawyers representing respondents were at least initially successful in persuading a court that many such analogous protections are required is Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974). See also
Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Hawaii 1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F.
Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v.
Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Slovenko, Criminal
Justice Proceduresin Civil Commitment, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 17-22 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Slovenko].
8. Although it is usual for the state's expert to be a psychiatrist, a clinical psychologist or other trained mental health professional would be permitted to testify as an
expert in most jurisdictions. In this article, I have used the term psychiatrist for convenience, but non-physician professionals may and sometimes do perform the same interviewing, diagnostic and testifying functions as psychiatrists.
9. Most commitment statutes provide for an initial period of detention before the
commitment hearing takes place. Civil Commitment, supra note 1, at 1275. The period
may be as long as 45 days, see Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Conn. 1972), afl'd
mem. sub nom. Briggs v. Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911 (1973). Some courts have found, however,
that prehearing detention is permissible only for a very brief period unless the state
establishes probable cause that the detained individual meets the state's criteria for
long-term involuntary confinement. See In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
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The use of respondent-generated evidence is surprising to
lawyers brought up in the Anglo-American tradition, who expect
that the state will not be permitted to exact one's cooperation in
his or her own imprisonment-a traditional value finding constitutional expression in the fifth amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination. This article is addressed to the question
whether the privilege against self-incrimination ought to be
available to persons facing civil commitment.
II. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ANALOGIES

The fifth amendment's protection against compelled self-incrimination offers the individual accused of a crime several important advantages. In the courtroom, it offers the defendant
not only the option to decline to answer questions the answers
to which might be incriminating, 0 but also the option to decline
to take the stand.1" It prohibits the prosecution from calling the
jury's attention to the defendant's failure to testify, and prohibits the judge from instructing the jury that it may take account
of the defendant's silence. It also forbids the jury, to the extent
that its deliberations can be policed, from drawing any unfavorable inferences from that silence. 12
Outside the courtroom, the privilege against self-incrimination contains several important limitations on the conduct of
state agencies-usually the police-in questioning any suspect in
custody. Suspects have an absolute right to remain silent, and
must be informed of that right. Suspects must be told that their
statements may be used against them. Any statement a suspect
makes in response to interrogation before having been advised of
the right to silence is inadmissible at any later judicial proceeding except for purposes of impeachment. In addition, the privilege against self-incrimination requires that suspects be informed of the right to counsel; if a suspect requests counsel,
either the request must be granted or all interrogation must
cease.13 Once the required advice is given, a suspect's silence in
response to interrogation cannot be the basis of later comment
at a trial or hearing-even for purposes of impeaching a defense
10.
11.
12.
13.
Ct. 1682

Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Id.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). But see Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S.
(1980) (narrowly interpreting "interrogation").
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or alibi later articulated. 4
In addition to the complicated network of warnings and
rules that it erects for the accused criminal in pretrial stages, the
privilege against self-incrimination assures that involuntary
statements-statements that are the results of official coercion,
force, or trickery, rather than willing acts of the accused-may
not be used against the accused for any purpose." No amount of
compliance with warnings and procedural niceties will alter this
result.
The situation of one taken into custody because he is suspected of mental illness presents a stark contrast to the situation of the accused criminal. Accused criminals are not, at least
in theory, taken into custody to make it convenient for the police to use them as sources of evidence. They are supposed to be
detained in most cases merely for completion of appropriate
charging routines and for some expeditious proceeding to assure,
through the mechanism of bail, that the accused will appear for
trial.' Persons suspected of being mentally disturbed are, on the
other hand, commonly confined for days or weeks for the express
purpose of giving the state's experts an opportunity to "investigate" their mental states, propensities for violence, and need for
treatment-precisely the characteristics that may form the basis
for their eventual involuntary confinement in an institution.17
14. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
15. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936).
16. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). Although the Mallory rule
prohibiting extended pre-arraignment questioning had no constitutional dimension, it is
clear that a statement taken after a prolonged and unnecessary delay between arrest and
arraignment will be of questionable voluntariness because of the delay. See also Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (right to judicial determination of probable cause for restraint of liberty); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1
(1951) (right to ball).
An exception to the statement in text may arise with regard to lineups, fingerprinting, etc. In this regard see text accompanying notes 30-32 infra. Another possible purpose for the pretrial detention of criminal suspects is preventive detention-restraining
them from committing further crimes while awaiting trial on pending charges. See People v. Melville, 62 Misc. 2d 366, 308 N.Y.S.2d 671 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1970). Preventive
detention is a controversial procedure, and its constitutionality has been much debated.
See, e.g., Foote, The Coming ConstitutionalCrisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 959 (1965);
Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. Rv.
1223 (1969); Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARv. L. Rav. 1489 (1966). In
any event, the preventive detention rationale justifies only confinement simpliciter; it
cannot justify any attempt to use the defendant as a source of evidence during his
confinement.
17. See note 9 supra. Many commitment statutes expressly provide that the purpose of the preliminary detention period is evaluation and diagnosis. See Brakel & Rock
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The mental health respondent will probably not be advised of
any right to remain silent during the psychiatric examination, or
that his or her statements may be the basis for involuntary commitment proceedings.18 Even if the respondent is told of the
right to counsel and indicates he or she wishes to exercise that
right, observation and testing will most likely continue until
counsel's arrival. Should the respondent refuse to speak to the
examiner, he or she still will not escape psychiatric probing. The
professional will analyze the respondent's demeanor and nonverbal attitudes, as well as the specific words used to express the
refusal to speak.1' Mental health professionals have been trained
to overcome the reluctance of their subjects.20 Any communications eventually made will probably be the product of the interviewer's skill rather than the freely chosen disclosures of the
respondent.
The mental health respondent's situation in court is less
clear. Since few mental health proceedings are jury trials, the
questions of comment upon and inference from a respondent's
supra note 5, at 50-51, 72-79, Table 3.2.
18. Indeed, the respondent may sometimes be advised to the contrary. Cf. Smith,
Psychiatric Examinations in Federal Mental Competency Proceedings, 37 F.R.D. 171,'
171-72 (1965). The Fourth Circuit held in Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir.
1971) that the privilege against self-incrimination does not require advising the subjects
of commitment proceedings that their statements may be used in such proceedings. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari sub nom. Murel v. Baltimore City Crim. Ct., 404 U.S.
909 (1971), but later dismissed it as improvidently granted, 407 U.S. 355 (1972).
But see Wis. Stat. § 51.20(9) (1977) ("Prior to the examination the subject individual shall be informed that his or her statements can be used as a basis for commitment
and that he or she has the right to remain silent, and that the examiner is required to
make a report to the court even if the subject individual remains silent."). It may also be
the practice of some mental health facilities to provide similar warnings even when not
statutorily required to do so. Such warnings, even when given, may be delivered in ambiguous terms. See, e.g., Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1978) (defendant
commited for restoration of competency told that he "had a right to refuse to talk" to
psychiatrist but that it "would be helpful" if he would talk). They may also be dictated
by nonconstitutional considerations. See Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 Mass. 490, 311
N.E.2d 47 (1974) (patient must be warned that statutory physician-patient privilege does
not apply and that the patient's statements may be used at commitment hearings).
19. For accounts of various evaluation techniques that do not depend on the cooperation or communicativeness of the subject, see H. DAVIDSON, FoRENsIc PSYCHIATRY 4546 (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as DAVIDSON]; Meyers, The PsychiatricExamination,
54 J. CRiM. L.C. &. P.S. 431 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Meyers]. See also Johnson v.
People, 172 Colo. 72, 77, 470 P.2d 37, 40 (1970) (psychiatrist permitted to testify concerning defendant's manner of refusing to cooperate in psychiatric examination).
20. See A. FREEDMAN, H. KAPLAN, & B. SADOCK, MODERN SYNOPSIS OF COMPREHENsIvE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY N 343-47 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FREEDMAN]. For an
extreme case of psychiatric skill employed to overcome a subject's desire to remain silent, see Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
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silence have not been fully litigated. It is unlikely that an objection to an expert witness's account of the respondent's refusal to
cooperate would be sustained on self-incrimination grounds."
Some courts have held that there is no prohibition against the
state's calling the respondent to the stand at a civil commitment
proceeding, 2 although this question is also seldom litigated.
How can these dramatic differences in the situation of the
criminal defendant and the mental health respondent be explained? Two explanations are borrowed from the law's customary treatment of the criminal defendant who pleads not guilty
by reason of insanity and then attempts to prevent the introduction of psychiatric testimony by invoking the fifth amendment
privilege. Many courts offer such a defendant no more protection from the introduction of psychiatric testimony than they
offer the mental health respondent. These courts find either that
the defendant is not being asked to contribute "testimonial" evidence, and hence that the privilege has no application, 8 or that
the defendant has "waived" the privilege.24 Courts which would
make one of these rulings in a criminal trial should have no difficulty extending that reasoning to mental health respondents. 5
The most significant explanation, however, is the characterization of commitment proceedings as "civil" in nature and hence
inappropriate forums for the invocation of protections designed
for the accused criminal.26 The following sections examine these
three explanations.
21. See Burgunder v. State, 55 Ariz. 411, 103 P.2d 256 (1940); People v. French, 12
Cal. 2d 720, 87 P.2d 1014 (1939). Lee v. County Court, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 442, 267 N.E.2d
452, 457, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705, 713, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971).
22. See, e.g., Cramer v. Tyars, 23 Cal. 3d 131, 588 P.2d 793, 151 Cal. Rptr. 653
(1979); People v. Keith, 38 II. 2d 405, 231 N.E.2d 387 (1967); McGuffin v. State, 571
S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 48 (5th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Handy, 454 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1971); Battle v. Cameron, 260 F. Supp. 804, 806
(D.D.C. 1966); Note, Mental Examinations of Defendants Who Plead Insanity:
Problems of Self-Incrimination, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 366, 372 (1967).
24. See, e.g., Karstetter v. Cardwell, 526 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 11, 210 A.2d 763, 767 (1976); State v. Swinburne, 324 S.W.2d 746 (Mo.
1959); Berry, Self-Incrimination and the Compulsory Mental Examination: A Proposal,
15 Aiz. L. REv. 919, 930 & nn.61-62, 938-39 & nn.104-06 (1973).
25. See, e.g., Cramer v. Tyars, 23 Cal. 3d 131, 588 P.2d 793 151 Cal. Rptr. 653
(1979).
26. See, e.g., Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir.), cert. granted sub. nom.
Murel v. Baltimore City Crim. Ct., 404 U.S. 999 (1971), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 407 U.S. 355 (1972); People v. Keith, 38 Ill. 2d 405, 231 N.E.2d 387 (1967);
McGuffin v. State, 571 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
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The Evidence Explanation: "Real" Versus "Testimonial"
1.

THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT

Even in criminal cases with no insanity issue, a defendant
must sometimes cooperate with the prosecution. A defendant
may be compelled, for example, to submit to the extraction of a
sample of blood or hair, 7 to speak into a voice analysis device,'8
or to exhibit his or her stature, posture, or gait to a witness or
jury.' 9 Such examples of coerced cooperation with the prosecution are said not to violate the privilege because they call for the
defendant's contribution of "real," rather than "testimonial,"
evidence.
Schmerber v. California0 is the United States Supreme
Court case that most clearly articulates the real-testimonial distinction. Schmerber was convicted of drunk driving partly on
the basis of an analysis of the alcohol content of a blood sample
withdrawn from his body. He argued that the extraction of the
blood over his objection violated his fifth and fourth amendment
rights and hence that the evidence should have been excluded
from his trial. The Court rejected the fifth amendment self-incrimination claim with the observation that the privilege protects an accused only from being forced to provide the state with
evidence of a "testimonial or communicative nature." 81 Justice
Brennan's majority opinion invoked the 1910 case of Holt v.
United States,' in which the Court found no violation of the
privilege in a requirement that a defendant model a blouse for
witnesses. Even before Holt was decided, Wigmore had articulated the distinction. He stated the privilege was limited to "testimonial disclosures" designed to "extract from the person's own
lips an admission of guilt.""3
Although Justice Brennan emphasized that the Court was
not accepting the Wigmore formulation completely,3 ' he mentioned several other types of evidence which would lie outside
the perimeters of the privilege: fingerprints, photographs, measurements, handwriting, speech, court appearances, and such
27. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood sample).
28. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
29. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); see Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
30. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
31. Id. at 761.
32. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
33. 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2263 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
34. 384 U.S. at 763 n.7.
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physical actions as assuming a stance, walking, and gesturing.8"
Justice Brennan did single out one type of evidence that Wigmore's "own lips" test might characterize as real but that he regarded as testimonial: evidence of physical changes of a person
answering questions while undergoing a polygraph or lie detector
examination.8 6 Despite the protestations of three dissenting Justices that the majority had given the privilege a technical, narrow interpretation, 7 the real-testimonial distinction articulated
in Schmerber has become an accepted element of self-incrimination doctrine. 88
The application of the Schmerber distinction to information
gleaned by a psychiatrist investigating an individual's mental
state is complex. The question has most often arisen in the context of those criminal proceedings where the defendant's mental
state is in issue either because the defendant put forward an insanity defense or because there is some doubt that the defendant had the necessary mens rea. Courts may take one of four
alternative positions in such cases. The first view is that such
evidence is always real: thus, no self-incrimination issue is
presented. The second view holds that psychiatric conclusions
are real: self-incrimination issues arise only when testifying psychiatrists go beyond conclusions, and relate the substance of defendant's statements. The third view allows psychiatric witnesses to state both their diagnoses and the defendant's
statements as long as those statements are presented only to aid
the jury in determining a defendant's mental condition. The evidence is real as to mental condition, but it is testimonial and
hence inadmissible as to any other issue. A fourth position,
which few courts have accepted, is that any evidence gleaned
from psychiatric interviews of defendants must be testimonial.
This view's lack of popularity is surprising, since each of the
other three positions is seriously flawed.
a. All disclosures are "real"
Under the first view, that compelled psychiatric disclosures
are always real rather than testimonial, a psychiatric expert is
35.

Id. at 764.

36. Id.; see also People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385
(1966) (agreeing in dictum that polygraph evidence is testimonial).

37. 384 U.S. at 777 (Black, J., dissenting).
38. See Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 370 (1963), for an exposition of the law in this area
prior to the Schmerber decision.
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seen as similar to a serologist who testifies concerning the alchohol content of blood drawn from a defendant, as in Schmerber.8 9 Proponents of the real characterization argue that the purpose of the interview is not to investigate the facts surrounding
the crime, but to discover something about the defendant's
mental condition. The interviewer is interested not in historical
or other facts that the defendant may relate, but in what the
defendant's perception of the facts, together with attitude and
demeanor, reveals about the defendant's mental condition.40
The view that compelled psychiatric disclosures are always
real is plainly unsatisfactory. To hold, as one court has," that an
outright confession to the commission of a crime poses no selfincrimination difficulties because it was made to a psychiatrist is
to elevate form over substance.
b.

Only conclusions are "real"

The second position depends upon the distinction between
repetition of a defendant's statements and psychiatric conclusions based on those statements. If the state seeks repetition or
summary of the statements through the testimony of the expert,
the statements are characterized as testimonial and are excluded. 2 If the psychiatrist merely relied on the statements to
arrive at a diagnosis, and if that diagnosis is described without
elaborating on the statements' content, then there is no self-incrimination violation because the statements are viewed as real
evidence.48
This position does avoid the direct use of admissions by the
defendant. Nevertheless, to the extent that an examiner's access
to those statements permits him to form and testify to his conclusion that a defendant had the necessary mental state, or was
sane at the time of the offense, the compelled making of the
statements plainly leads to self-incrimination. To rule that a
psychiatrist can testify to an opinion of the defendant's sanity,
on the basis of statements that the psychiatrist does not dis39. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
40. See A. GUtTMACHER, PSYCHIATRY & THE LAW 284-86 (1952); State v. Genna, 163
La. 701, 112 So. 655 (1925), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 522 (1927); State v. Petty, 32 Nev. 384,
388-89, 108 P. 934, 935-36 (1910).
41. Hall v. State, 209 Ark. 180, 187-88, 189 S.W.2d 917, 921 (1945) (confession
made during mental exam admissible because procured pursuant to permissible purposes

of exam).
42.
43.

See Berry, supra note 24, at 929-936.
Id. at 940-44.
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close, would be analogous to holding that a police officer could
testify that the officer believes a defendant to be guilty on the
basis of involuntary statements the defendant made to the officer-so long as the officer did not directly quote from those
statements. 44 Seen in this context, the self-incrimination violation is blatant.
That expert witnesses are allowed to testify concerning their
tonclusions is not decisive of the question of whether the data
on which their conclusions rest are real or testimonial. The
blood test results in Schmerber were not considered real only
because the serologist testified to a conclusion. Rather, the blood
was itself real. Surely exhibiting the blood to the jury or permitting it to make its own analysis would not have changed the
blood's character to testimonial. Conversely, the testimonial
character of the readout from a lie detector would not be altered
if the polygraph operator merely stated as a conclusion that the
defendant was lying, without disclosing what the actual measurements of the instruments were. 4
A further difficulty created by the conclusion view is that it
would make effective cross-examination impossible. A defendant's attorney could expose the premises of an examiner's opinion only by asking questions that would open the door to the
examiner's repetition of the defendant's statements. The practical effect of this view would be to condition the privilege against
self-incrimination on the relinquishment of a defendant's right
to cross-examine adverse witnesses." 6 Such a mutually exclusive
conditioning of rights may not be unconstitutional, 7 but does
suggest that the protection offered by the rule is somewhat
illusory.
c.

"Mental" evidence is "real"

The third position-which the second may be an unsuccessful attempt to articulate-holds that a defendant's statements in
the course of an examination are testimonial when offered to
prove some non-mental element of the crime, but real when admitted regarding an issue related to the defendant's mental con44.

The familiar evidentiary rule against the statement of opinions or conclusions

by lay witnesses would, of course, bar such testimony by a police officer in any event.
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination ought to have some independent
force sufficient to achieve the same result.
45. See text accompanying notes 30-38 supra.
46. Cf. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
47. See text accompanying notes 126-34 infra.
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dition. 5 This view does not examine whether a defendant's
statements are merely being repeated or are being used in the
formulation of a diagnosis."" Rather, it rests on the linguistic argument that statements are testimonial only when offered to
prove the truth of their contents. When a testifying psychiatrist
uses and depends on a subject's statements to draw conclusions
not as to truth, but rather as to mental state, the evidence is real
and the privilege is not violated.50 The Model Penal Code,51 as'
well as statutory provisions in several states52 and one federal
statute, 3 adopt this mental/non-mental distinction. Of course, a
statement might bear on both the commission of the criminal
act and the defendant's mental condition ("I killed him because
he was plotting against me."). This problem is handled in jurisdictions holding the mental view by instructions that admonish
the jury to consider the statements only to the extent that they
relate to the defendant's mental condition." This distinction, regarding what the statement is offered to prove, is borrowed from
the law of hearsay.5 5 It emphasizes those functions of the privilege against self-incrimination that protect defendants from the
temptation to commit perjury,5 ' and those that guard against
the evidentiary use of unreliable statements. It has been said
48. See, e.g., United States v. Weiser, 428 F.2d 932, 936 (2d Cir. 1969) ("[T]he
Government's expert [was not] allowed to testify about any statement of defendant relating to his guilt or innocence of the offense charged."); United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d
700, 709-10 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1005 (1970).
49. Although it seems unlikely that a psychiatric diagnosis would ever be relevant
to any element of the offense other than one related to the defendant's mental condition,
the defendant's actual statements may be relevant to both issues.
50. See Berry, supra note 24, at 942.
51. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.09, (Official Draft 1962).
52. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552-020(9), .030(6) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (refers to competency examinations); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 46-14-401 (1979); N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW
§ 730.20 (McKinney 1979); TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 46.02(4)(f) (Vernon 1979); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 4816 (Supp. 1979).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970).
54. See, e.g., State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 16-17, 210 A.2d 763, 775 (1965).
55. In United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700, 707-08 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1005 (1970), the court was explicit about the relation between the non-hearsay nature of statements offered to show something other than the truth of their contents and
the idea of "real" or "nontestimonial" evidence. See also State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 25,
210 A.2d 763, 772 (1965).
56. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 252 (1972 ed.); United States v. Grunewald,
233 F.2d 556, 591 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). One
student commentator suggests that a touchstone for distinguishing real from testimonial
evidence is that its source cannot falsify real evidence and hence is under no temptation
to lie. Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric
Examination: An Invasion of the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 83 HARV. L. REv.
648, 656 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Requiring a Criminal Defendant].
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that the privilege saves defendants from the "cruel trilemma" of
choosing among perjury, incrimination, and contempt.5 7 If the
statement's truth is immaterial, the argument runs, then the
conflict is resolved because the speaker need not fear perjury;
the materiality of a false statement is of course a necessary element of perjury, and in the interview situation the truth of the
statement is immaterial. This argument seems defective for several reasons.
First, if this "trilemma" were the sole basis for the privilege
against self-incrimination, the privilege would not extend to any
statements made to psychiatrists, even those offered to prove
that the defendant committed the criminal act charged. Statements made to examining psychiatrists ordinarily are not sworn
and so could not support a perjury prosecution for a reason
much more fundamental than their lack of materiality. In extending the privilege to statements made to examiners and offered to prove historic facts, the drafters of the Model Penal
Code and their followers implicitly recognized that a technical
application of the law of perjury should not determine the privilege's scope. This recognition is entirely sound, for it is well-established that the privilege extends to the products of police interrogation and other unsworn statements.5 8 Thus, the grounds
for the privilege must be broader than merely protecting defendants from the temptation to commit perjury as that crime has
traditionally been defined.
Second, the argument's resolution of the trilemma depends
on a subject's awareness that statements are elicited for some
purpose other than factual accuracy. If the subject believes the
factual content relevant, and if truthful statements would in fact
incriminate the subject, then the unknown circumstance that
the statements are actually sought for some other purpose would
not resolve the subject's mental conflict.5 9
57. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
58. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
59. To test further the logic of the position that statements are testimonial only
when offered to prove the truth of their contents, consider the case of a person who
knows that there is a perjury statute that defines as a crime the making under oath of
two material inconsistent statements; such a statute obviates the need for the government to prove which of the statements is false. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c) (1977).
Suppose that the person is then called as a witness in a judicial proceeding and asked a
question that the person has already once answered under oath. The government is not
interested in the truth or falsity of the second statement; it cares only whether the second statement is inconsistent with the first. Proponents of this third position must maintain that the witness has no privilege against self-incrimination related to the existence
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Another argument for the third view is that the mental distinction eliminates the risk of unreliable evidence. According to
this argument, statements made in psychiatric examinations are
not taken to be true by examiners; rather, they are used, as are
blood samples, as neutral data for scientific analysis.60 There
should be no more danger, therefore, of a psychiatric examination producing false data than of a blood test eliciting false
blood. Correspondingly, there should be no need for the protection afforded by the self-incrimination clause, at least so long as
the relevance of the statements made is limited to their support
of an examiner's conclusions about a subject's mental state.
The problem with this argument is that in many cases an
examiner is interested in the objective accuracy of a subject's
statements. To the extent the examiner mistakenly relies on an
inaccurate statement, the examiner's professional opinion may
be unreliable.61 Probably any psychiatric opinion depends in
part on data whose perception does not depend on the truth of
the subject's accounts, and in part on the examiner's conclusions
concerning the objective truth about historical events or present
circumstances. For example, the statement "I chopped off his
head because he was turning into a snake" is one that has some
clinical significance that does not depend on its truth. That the
subject says the victim was turning into a snake is important;
the examiner need not believe the statement in order to draw
conclusions about the subject's mental state. On the other hand,
whether the subject really did chop off a person's head is also
important to the examiner. One who fantasizes or lies about
such an act may be disturbed, but in a different way from one
who actually commits it. Not only outright lies or misstatements, but also false implicit representations, can form an unreof the perjury statute which would protect against being compelled to answer the ques-

tion a second time. This result is alarming because it places the witness who did lie
during the first testimony precisely in the "cruel trilemma." If the witness refuses to
answer the question when asked the second time, the court may impose the contempt
sanction. If the witness answers the second time as the first, the witness commits perjury. If the witness answers truthfully the second time, he or she is incriminated by
contradicting the earlier testimony and providing the government with exactly the evi-

dence it needs to convict on a charge of perjury. But see United States v. Apfelbaum, 445
U.S. 115 (1980) (apparently sanctioning putting a witness to such a trilemma; when this
is accomplished by immunizing the second testimony).
60. See Aronson, Should the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Apply To Compelled PsychiatricExaminations?, 26 STAN. L. REv. 55, 90 (1973) ("attempts to deceive
the psychiatrist may even aid in the determination of the extent of illness").

61. See Gerard, "Psychiatric Evaluation", in A. BROOKS,

LAW, PSYCHIATRY,

MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 21-26 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Gerard].
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liable basis for an expert opinion. If an examiner asks a subject
the month and year and the subject intentionally misstates them
to create an impression of disorientation, the examiner may be
misled. It is not the falseness of the answer that misleads, for
the examiner knows the month and year, but the falseness of the
implicit representation that the subject does not know.
Considerable evidence exists that the psychiatric examination has a tendency to elicit untrue or unreliable evidence. Textbooks on psychiatric interviewing give great attention to the
many ways in which false impressions may be created. For example, a certain type of patient "may be the source of much
misinformation, either because he misunderstands the context of
a discussion or because, in order to be spared further effort, he
may answer 'yes' to any question or, in an indiscriminating way,
disagrees with everything."' 62 A different type of patient is said

to "tell untruths with glibness and assurance."" Other patients
may not only tell explicit untruths, but may also attempt to appear either more or less disturbed than they actually are." Furthermore, many mentally disturbed persons are very suggestible,
and may consciously adopt the symptoms they sense the examiner expects to find. e
To these observations it may be replied that because psychiatrists are trained in the art of detecting falsehood and malingering, it is unlikely that a psychiatrist will arrive at an inaccurate diagnosis because of an examinee's tendencies or attempts
to mislead.66 This response misses the point of the untrustwor62.

Whitehorn, Guide to Interviewing and Clinical Personality Study, in

INGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY

READ-

120, 121 (Allen, Ferster, Rubin eds. rev. & expanded ed.

1975) [hereinafter cited as Whitehornl.
63. DAVIDSON, supra note 19, at 39.

64. See Requiring a Criminal Defendant, supra note 56, at 658.
65. See generally the many studies cited in J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTiMONY (2d ed. 1975) at 120-28 [hereinafter cited as ZISKIN].
66. This premise undoubtedly underlies the rule of evidence that permits experts
to testify to opinions formed on the basis of inadmissible evidence, such as hearsay, if
such evidence is commonly used by experts in that field as the basis of opinions. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 15 (1972 ed.); FED. R. Evm. 703. In addition, statements made to physicians in the course of medical diagnosis or treatment are treated as an exception to the
hearsay rule, suggesting that the law of evidence at least does not regard such statements
as untrustworthy. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 292 (1972 ed.); FED. R. EVID. 803(4). See generally, Note, Hearsay Bases of Psychiatric Opinion Testimony: A Critique of Federal
Rule of Evidence 703, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 129 (1977).
Yet the hearsay exception depends upon the notion that the patient has a strong
interest in making accurate statements to the examining physician, see Advisory Comm's
Note, FED. R. EvD. 803(4), an assumption that may be unwarranted in the psychiatric
context. Indeed, the exception usually does not apply if the examination is conducted for
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thiness concern. The privilege against self-incrimination is not

threatened when the subject of a psychiatric examination attempts to and does mislead an examiner. Rather, the privilege is
threatened when an examiner, because of expectations, biases, or
interviewing style, provokes inaccurate or misleading responses

from his subject.
Numerous experiments suggest a high likelihood that two

psychiatrists who have examined the same patient will arrive at
different diagnoses.6 7 These discrepancies may be attributed in
part to the psychiatrists' differing evaluations of the accuracy of
the patient's statements or to the impression created by the pa-

tient's answers.es In one famous experiment, psychiatrists at several mental institutions-including some considered excellent-failed to detect the presence of persons who had been sent

to the institutions to pose as patients; the same persons were
diagnosed as schizophrenic."

In a converse experiment, staff

members at another institution were told of the results of the
first experiment and challenged to detect pseudopatients
through their own admissions process. The staff, with a high degree of confidence and accord, identified forty-one of 193 admitted patients as pseudopatients. In fact, the experimenters had
purposes unrelated to the patient's desire for diagnosis and treatment. This would seem

to exclude statements made in a psychiatric examination. See id. (rejecting the distinction); compare UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 803(4). In the absence of a hearsay exception
for the patient's statements, the rule that permits testimony as to opinions based on
hearsay would seem to revive the unworkable distinction, discussed above, between the
statement of an opinion and the recitation of the data on which it is based.
Measured claims for the psychiatrist's skill at detecting prevarication are made in A.
GurrMACHER, supra note 40, at 360-79. Not all psychiatrists are so modest. Guttmacher
reports the incident in which a psychiatrist and a psychologist declared that Whittaker
Chambers, the principal witness against Alger Hiss, was a liar, on the basis of an examination of his writings and observations of his testimony. Neither had ever interviewed
Chambers in a clinical setting. Id. at 364. The incident is recounted in A. WEINSTEIN,
PERJURY: THE Hiss-CHAMBERS CASE 485-92 (1978). See also DAVIDSON, supra note 19, at

211-39, 253-70.
67. See ZISIUN, supra note 65 (indicating that according to the most common
research findings, one cannot expect to find agreement between two psychiatrists in more
than about 60% of cases); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 708 (1974) (citing numerous
studies concerning the unreliability of psychiatric diagnosis).
68. See note 72, infra. Dr. Bernard Diamond recounts a case in which experts disagreed about whether a criminal defendant was or was not sane. Diamond identifies the
source of the inconsistency as "the question as to whether certain statements asserted by
the defendant -were actually delusions or whether they were true, or possible exaggerations, or perhaps even deliberate lies." Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert,
in READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 145, 147 (Allen, Ferster, Rubin eds. 1968).
69. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 379 (1973),
originally published at 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Rosenhan].
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placed no pseudopatients in that institution.70 These experiments, and others like them, illustrate the extent to which the
expectations of an examiner may influence that examiner's assessment of a particular patient. This dynamic may lead not
only to the erroneous crediting of inaccurate information provided by a patient, but also to the erroneous dismissal of truthful information that does not comport with an examiner's theory
or diagnosis.
To be sure, it may be objected that the privilege is not intended to protect against unreliable interpretations of data but
only against the elicitation of data that is itself false or misleading.71 Studies have shown, however, that discrepancies among
psychiatrists who diagnose the same patient may be largely related to the different data their varying interview techniques
elicited.72 These studies suggest a pervasive problem in psychiatric examinations: data elicited from a respondent, independent
of any vagaries of interpretation, may be misleading.
In theory, cross-examination could reveal false or misleading data elicited in a psychiatric interview. In practice, such misleading data cannot easily be dispelled by cross-examination of a
psychiatrist. If the diagnosis is challenged, the psychiatrist may
refer to the statements or events that occurred during the examination of the respondent as evidence supporting the diagnosis.
A lawyer who did not attend the interview will be unlikely to be
able to argue convincingly that the basis of the psychiatrist's
conclusions is a misimpression or falsehood.
Nor does the availability of the respondent at trial, where in
theory that respondent could correct the falsehood or misimpression, eliminate the prospect of unreliability. First, the process of misrepresentation in the psychiatric examination is often
unconscious; the respondent may continue to have the same unconscious motivation to misrepresent at trial. Second, to the extent that the misimpression is a result of either implicit misrep70. Rosenhan, supra, note 69, at 386.
71. See Civil Commitment, supra note 1, at 1308 n.255.
72. Some of the most impressive such findings are reported in Masling, Role-Related Behavior of the Subject and Psychologist and Its Effects upon Psychological
Data, 14 CURRENT THEORY AND RESEARCH IN MOTIVATION 67 (1966). Many psychiatrists
have made the same observation. See, e.g., Rosenzweig, Vandenberg, Moore, & Dukay, A
Study of the Reliability of the Mental Status Examination, 117 AM. J. PsycH. 1102,
1107 (1961) ("[Wlhile reliability was not significantly influenced by individual bias in
interpretation of concepts or by individual capacity to make observations, it was significantly influenced by individual differences in interviewing technique.") [hereinafter cited
as Rosenzweig]. See also ZISKIN, supra note 65, at 120-30.
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resentations of self by the respondent, or statements which are
not fully described by the examiner, the respondent and his or
her lawyer may not know what corrections to make. Even if they
could locate the misleading data, an attempt to re-enact the psychiatric examination by having the respondent recount dreams
or take an intelligence test on the witness stand would pose obvious problems of validity and reliability. In any event, such an
attempt undoubtedly would be strongly resisted by the prosecutor and judge. Finally, the correction of the misimpression by
the respondent's own testimony would require that the respondent surrender the privilege not to testify at trial."
A final objection to the mental/non-mental view is its dependence on limiting instructions to insure that statements are
considered in connection only with mental and not with factual
issues. The Supreme Court has rejected, in a slightly different
context, the proposition that evidence inadmissible because of
the privilege may be presented to the jury with a limiting instruction. In Jackson v. Denno,74 the Court disallowed the practice of presenting a confession to a jury together with directions
that it should be considered only if the jury first found it to have
been voluntary. The Court concluded that the danger that a jury
would disregard the instructions was so substantial that the procedure violated a defendant's due process rights.
Four years later, in Bruton v. United States," the Court
again indicated skepticism about the effectiveness of limiting instructions. In that case, the Court disapproved the trial court's
ruling, which had permitted the introduction of Bruton's codefendant's confession accompanied by instructions that it was relevant only to the codefendant's, and not to Bruton's, guilt. The
unrestricted admission of the confession would have violated
Bruton's right to confrontation; the Court held that the cautionary instruction did not cure the violation. In both Jackson and
Bruton, the Court observed that the risk of jury disregard of instructions was one of "[t]hese hazards we cannot ignore. ' 76
The limiting instructions required by the mental/nonmental theory would ask jurors to make intrinsically complex
73. This difficulty may be avoided in jurisdictions that have bifurcated trials in
which the insanity issues are tried separately from issues related to factual guilt. But see
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-106(2) (1978) (defendant's testimony at sanity trial, which precedes trial for factual guilt, may be used to impeach later testimony).
74. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
75. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
76. 378 U.S. at 389; 391 U.S. at 137.
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and difficult judgments in identifying the circumstances under
which they may consider a defendant's statements. The hazard
that these instructions would be ineffective is perhaps even
greater than in the circumstances of Jackson or Bruton. Thus,
Jackson and Bruton suggest that even if the Model Penal Code
formulation of the extent of the privilege is otherwise correct, it
is unusable in practice because of the limitations of cautionary
instructions.
d. Disclosure always "testimonial"
Since the absolutist "real" view and both compromise views
about the nature of psychiatric evidence are seriously objectionable, the conclusion that any use of the statements of a criminal
defendant made in a psychiatric examination must be testimonial seems attractive. Moreover, considerations beyond the inadequacy of the competing positions favor this conclusion. The
protection of persons from involuntary or uninformed cooperation with government psychiatrists in a criminal context is consistent with important values that underlie the privilege against
self-incrimination.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged both that there are
several values protected by the privilege and that none of the
values is paramount to all other considerations." In addition to
the "cruel trilemma" and "unreliable evidence" justifications,
the Court has articulated the following rationales for the privilege: the "right of each individual to an enclave where he can
lead a private life"; the desire to deter inhumane treatment of
an accused; and the requirement that the state must carry its
burden of proof without resort to evidence acquired from an
accused.

78

None of these policies is entitled to absolute vindication.
For example, the accusatorial notion that an individual should
not have to contribute anything to the state's case against that
individual is clearly violated by the Schmerber rule requiring
contribution of physical evidence. Similarly, the "inhumanity"
justification has limitations. Many of the permissible procedures
necessary to extract physical evidence from a suspect, for example, the unconsented removal of blood or a bullet, 9 seem more
77.
78.
79.
511, 192

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762-63 (1966).
See Requiring a Criminal Defendant, supra note 56, at 655-56.
See, e.g., People v. Smith, 362 N.Y.S. 2d 909 (1974); Creamer v. State, 229 Ga.
S.E.2d 350, (1972), cert. dismissed sub nom. Creamer v. Georgia, 410 U.S. 1975
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inhumane than techniques designed to elicit verbal statements,
that have been found to violate the privilege.8 0 The notion of a
private enclave, in which a person's thoughts and beliefs are protected from governmental probing, seems the strongest value behind the law of self-incrimination.
The Supreme Court has twice affirmed the view that the
privilege against self-incrimination protects "a private inner
sanctum of individual feeling and thought.""1 Sometimes this
notion is articulated as a branch of the right to privacy.82 Such a
right is not invaded by requiring an individual to produce blood
for analysis, but is violated when the individual must voice his
or her thoughts. Indeed, only this view of the purpose of the
privilege can fully explain the testimonial-real distinction; the
idea of mental privacy lies behind Justice Brennan's comment in
Schmerber that evidence of physiological changes in the subject
of a polygraph examination is testimonial rather than real.83 The
importance accorded this value is not surprising, since the idea
of privacy of thought figured largely in the historic struggle to
force recognition of a privilege against self-incrimination. 4
Compulsory pretrial psychiatric examinations in criminal
cases pose significant opportunities for invasion of a defendant's
feelings and beliefs. Such examinations typically include a
lengthy interview between defendant and psychiatrist in which
the psychitrist seeks to overcome the dpfendant's reluctance to
expose his or her most private thoughts and feelings.8 5 Much of
a mental health professional's training in interviewing provides
skills to uncover thoughts and feelings that an interviewee would
(1972).
80. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
81. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 (1975); Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 327 (1973).
82. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 193
[hereinafter cited as McKay].
83. See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra. Even if the verbal component of the
polygraph examination were eliminated entirely, and the operator merely recorded the

subject's physical responses to certain stimuli without requiring the subject to speak, the
responses ought to be classed as testimonial under the privacy view because those re-

sponses reveal thoughts and feelings.
84.

See L. LEVY, THE ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 302-32 (1968); W. SCHAESocm'rr 72-73 (1967) ("There is no doubt the privilege played a

FER, THE SUSPECT AND

leading role in the struggle to achieve religious and political liberty, both in England and
in the American colonies.").
85. For accounts of the typical course of a psychiatric interview see DAVIDSON,
supra note 19, at 23-29; FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 343-53; Gerard, supra note 61, at
21-26; Meyers, supra note 19.
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rather keep hidden. 86 The use of such skills is reminiscent of police interrogation procedures that the Supreme Court condemned in Miranda v. Arizona.8 In many respects the psychiatric interview is more invasive of a subject's personality than is a
police interrogation, since the psychiatric examiner seeks to
elicit not only a factual account of the crime, but to probe the
subject's emotions, fears, dreams, and defenses. 88 Few of us can
contemplate the prospect of another becoming privy to all of our
mental processes without a sense of great anxiety and violation.
An important aspect of the constitutional right of privacy is the
right to control the flow of information about one's
thoughts-the right to decide what information will be shared
with whom. 9 We experience a sense of great violation when that
right is taken away.
Another aspect of the privacy view is the fear that a psychiatric examination will in some way alter or distort- a subject's
mental functioning. The line between psychiatric examination
and psychiatric treatment is not a bright one, 90 and compelled
psychiatric treatment may pose a threat of temporary or permanent alteration of one's mental functioning. Even when the examination confines itself strictly to diagnosis, it may be profoundly upsetting to the subject. Indeed, persons have required
psychotherapy to recover from the effects of a psychiatric examination.2 This invasion of privacy is compounded if the examina86. A description of some such techniques appears at Meyers, supra note 19, at
439; see also FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 343-47.
87. 384 U.S. 436, 448-55 (1966).
88. See, e.g., Meyers, supra note 19.
89. See Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
90. See Whitehorn, supra note 62, at 121 ("It is incorrect to think that the examiner can first gather the information and then start the psychotherapy. The psychotherapy begins at the very first contact. .... ).
91. There is copious literature about the effects of various forms of behavior and
thought alteration through psychotherapy, chemotherapy, behavior modification, and the
like. See, e.g., Du Bose, Of the Parens PatriaeCommitment Power and Drug Treatment
of Schizophrenia: Do the Benefits to the Patients Justify Involuntary Treatment?, 60
MINN. L. REv. 1149 (1976); Gobert, Psychosurgery, Conditioning, and the Prisoner's
Right to Refuse "Rehabilitation," 61 VA. L. REv. 155 (1975); Klerman, Psychotropic
Drugs As Therapeutic Agents, 2 HASTINGS CENTER STUDIES 81 (1974); Plotkin, Limiting
the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw.U. L. REv.
461 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Plotkin]; Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior
Control: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro]; Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used
to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?""Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L.
REv. 616 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Technologies]; Symposium, Viewpoints on Behavioral Issues in Closed Institutions, 17 ARiz. L. REv. 1, 1-143 (1975).
92. See Smith, PsychiatricExaminations in Federal Mental Competency Proceed-
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tion process includes the administration of drugs designed to remove inhibition or disable the subject from lying.98
These privacy aspects of the fifth amendment privilege have
a distinctly first amendment cast to them.94 The fear that unwanted psychiatric intervention will alter one's mental functioning has been recognized by some courts" as a legitimate basis
for a claim that one's freedom of expression has been violated.
These courts, with the support of several commentators," argue
that a necessary prerequisite to freedom of expression is freedom of thought, or "mentation." Preventing the generation of
thought is, in their view, an invasion of first amendment freedoms at least as serious as preventing the expression of a
thought already formed. To the extent that therapeutic psychiatric treatment disables an unwilling subject from generating
thoughts and feelings that the subject otherwise would experience, the subject's freedom of expression is limited. Even if a
psychiatric interview avoids any therapeutic component, knowledge that psychiatric inquiry may be in the offing could have an
inhibiting effect on freedom of thought and belief. As one writer
observed:
If the right to speak and write without official restraint is guaranteed by the First Amendment, as all agree is the case, does it
not follow that there is a parallel freedom not to speak and not
to write? This may be described as a freedom of silence, which
includes within its coverage the more specific freedom to remain silent when the price of speech may be conviction of
crime."
This argument should not suggest that the "privacy" aspects of
the privilege against self-incrimination do not have special significance in the criminal context, when an invasion of mental
privacy can have disastrous consequences that are not present in
other settings. To anticipate a point treated later," it does sugings, 37 F.R.D. 171, 172 (1965).
93. See Meyers, supra note 19, at 440.

94. See generally W.
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71-76 (1966); McKay,

supra note 82, at 212-14.

95. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F.
Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978); Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, Civ. No. 7319434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct. of Wayne County, July 10, 1973), reprinted in A. BROOKS,
LAW, PSYCHIATRY, & THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 902 (1974).
96. See, e.g., Plotkin, supra note 91, at 494; Shapiro, supra note 91; Technologies,
supra note 91.
97. McKay, supra note 82, at 212.
98. See text accompanying notes 143-83 infra.
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gest that the strict characterization of a proceeding as "civil" or
"criminal" or something in between should not conclude the
question of whether the subject of the proceeding ought to be
able to resist governmental attempts to breach the "private inner sanctum" of his thoughts and feelings.
e.

Summary

In summary, the use of statements made by a criminal defendant during a psychiatric examination, or the use of testimony from an examiner who forms an opinion based in part on
those statements, poses real self-incrimination problems not
solved by the easy characterization of the defendant's statements as real evidence. Whatever may be the case with respect
to blood samples, EEG readings, and other evidence of physical
functioning, diagnoses based on statements seriously invade the
personal privacy of the defendant and pose a significant risk of
the production of untrustworthy evidence.0 ' The real-testimonial
distinction does not lie at the heart of the problem. This can
clearly be seen by considering the suggestion that in any criminal case the prosecution should be permitted to subject a defendant to psychiatric examination in order to establish that the
defendant had the requisite mens rea. If the information gained
thereby were truly nontestimonial, there should be no objection.
I doubt, however, that even the most ardent defender of compulsory examinations in insanity cases would endorse that
suggestion.
99. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), implies that tests of physical
functions such as blood analysis, EEG readings, or reflex tests would not fall within the
privilege if conducted independently of any verbal questioning of the defendant. There
may be cases in which it is difficult to distinguish between observations that can permissibly form the basis of an expert opinion and those that, because of their self-incriminatory nature, cannot. For example, it is unclear whether a psychiatrist may testify that a
conclusion of sanity was made because the defendant refused, in a coherent and
steadfast manner, to talk to the psychiatrist. Such testimony might penalize the subject
for exercising the right to remain silent. One important criterion might be whether the
subject was advised of that right. Cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (prosecutor may

not comment on silence of suspect who has been advised of his right to silence).
Similar problems are presented when a psychiatrist relies on information provided
by custodial or nursing staff members concerning the defendant's behavior on the ward

or the defendant's conversations with the staff or other patients. One important question
is whether such statements are made in response to "interrogation." Cf. Kamisar, Brewer
v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is Interrogation?When Does It Matter?, 67

Gao. L.J. 1 (1978). The Supreme Court has recently construed "interrogation" very narrowly. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
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THE CIVIL COMMITMENT CONTEXT

Most reported cases that consider the applicability of the
privilege against self-incrimination to psychiatric examinations
have been criminal cases. The next question, postponing consideration of the claim that the privilege does not apply at all in
civil cases, is whether the real-testimonial distinction might be
more persuasive in the context of civil commitment proceedings.
It may be argued that statements made by a civil commitment respondent during a psychiatric examination should be
considered nontestimonial, in a way that statements made by a
criminal defendant claiming insanity are not, because of the different inquiry in a commitment proceeding. In a civil commitment, one of the tasks of the examiner is to determine whether
the respondent is mentally ill.' 00 Arguably, this inquiry has less
relation to historical events than the inquiry in a criminal case,
in which the question is whether the defendant was insane at
the time the crime was committed. Since only present mental
functioning is important in civil commitment, it may be argued
that the examiner seeks the respondent's verbal responses only
for their nontestimonial value, and has no interest in their
content.
This argument is not convincing. First, nothing in the history or rationale of the self-incrimination privilege limits its protections to accounts of historical events. If a man captured with
a quantity of dynamite were interrogated, without Miranda
warnings, concerning what he intended to do with the dynamite,
his admission that he planned to use it to kill the President
would be both testimonial and incriminating if introduced at his
trial for attempted murder. That the statement concerned his
current mental state rather than his past actions would not alter
this result.
Second, statements related to present functioning and
thinking may be as unreliable as statements about the past,
when elicited under coercive circumstances.' 01 If the information
they elicit is misleading or incorrect, the privilege is necessary to
insure against the evidentiary use of untrustworthy statements.
The criteria for civil commitment typically include not only a
100. Although mental illness is not a sufficient condition for civil commitment in
most jurisdictions, it is a necessary one. See 3 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 205-14 (1979).
101. See Rosenzweig, supra note 72. The examinations studied by Dr. Rosenzweig

et al. were designed to assess present mental functioning rather than past sanity. This
was also true of the Rosenhan study. See note 69 supra.
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diagnosis of mental illness, but also a prediction about the impact the illness is likely to have on the subject's functioning. A
major question, for example, is whether the respondent is "dangerous to himself or others."10 In making such predictions, the
examiner frequently leans heavily on the past by looking for certain predictors of criminal or violent behavior in the respondent's history.103 A misleading or inaccurate history given by a
respondent may have a devastating impact on the examiner's ac10 4
curate assessment of the respondent's potential for violence.
Most important, the privacy protected by the self-incrimination privilege is invaded even more seriously by an enforced
psychiatric assessment of present mental functioning than by an
investigation of past mental state. The civil commitment inquiry
is both broader and deeper than the criminal inquiry. It encompasses multiple aspects of mental functioning, rather than the
narrow issue of responsibility; it covers past, present,, and future.
Aspects of the personality that would rarely be explored in a
determination of criminal insanity, for example mania or depression, are often topics of inquiry when the broader issue of
mental health is in question. Requiring cooperation with an examination that has such limitless scope forces a respondent to
surrender almost every scrap of mental privacy. The reliability
and privacy values that the self-incrimination clause protects
are, therefore, infringed at least as much by compelled cooperation in the civil commitment context as in the criminal insanity
context.
B.
1.

The Waiver Explanation
THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT.

a. Implied waiver
A second argument against applying the privilege to the
products of psychiatric examinations in criminal insanity cases
relies on the notion of waiver. Two distinct waiver arguments
have been proffered by courts: that of "implied," and that of
"constructive," waiver. 103 The implied waiver argument holds
102. See 3 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 205-14 (1979).
103. See, e.g., Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 371, 384 (1972) (the most important information
for the examiner attempting to diagnose dangerousness . . .the details of previous as-

saults committed by the respondent).
104.
105.

See id. at 385.
See Berry, supra note 24, at 938.
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that a person who cooperates in a psychiatric examination cannot later be heard to complain that the cooperation was involuntary: by cooperating, the person has impliedly waived the privilege.10 6 This argument clearly could not justify the imposition of
affirmative sanctions on an uncooperative defendant. The selfincrimination question most often arises, however, when a defendant has made revelations to a psychiatrist and then seeks to
exclude the psychiatrist's testimony at trial.10 7 The implied
waiver argument holds that the objection to the testimony
comes too late, since the defendant has already submitted to the
examination.
An implied waiver theory might have been persuasive prior
to Miranda v. Arizona,10 8 but it is of little force today. Miranda,
addressing the problem of custodial interrogations, erected a
presumption against a finding of waiver. The case held that an
in-custody suspect must be advised of the right to counsel and
the right to remain silent before a waiver could be valid.109 Further, Miranda placed a "heavy burden" on the state to demonstrate that any waiver was knowing and intelligent, even when
all of the appropriate warnings had been given. 110
Of course, if a psychiatric examination were viewed as other
than a "custodial" interrogation, it could escape the full force of
the Miranda presumption against waiver. The Miranda Court
emphasized that any "significant depriv[ation]" of the liberty of
a suspect rendered an interrogation "custodial." ' The Miranda
opinion indicated that this was especially true when the circumstances of restraint or confinement created a psychological pressure for an unwilling person to talk.1 12 Although psychiatric examinations typically take place in hospitals rather than police
stations, any respondent is clearly significantly deprived of liberty. Since the whole point of the examination is to interview
the respondent, the physical and psychological pressures on the
respondent to talk are enormous. Psychiatric examinations can106. See Lefelt, PretrialMental Examinations: Compelled Cooperation and the
Fifth Amendment, 10 AM. CalM. L. REv. 431, 436-37 nn.34-38 & cases cited therein
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Lefelt].
107. See, e.g., People v. Ditson, 57 Cal. 2d 415, 448, 369 P.2d 714, 733, 20 Cal. Rptr.
165, 184 (1962) ("[The defendant] was not compelled to submit to the psychiatric examination; he did so voluntarily.").
108. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
109. Id. at 444.
110. Id. at 475.
111. Id. at 444. See also Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
112. 384 U.S. at 455-58.
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not therefore be viewed as other than custodial and cannot escape the Miranda presumption. When that presumption is used,
the implied waiver argument crumbles. Miranda insuperably refutes the claim that the cooperative respondent in a psychiatric
examination, not having been advised of the right to remain silent, can impliedly waive the privilege against self-incrimination.
b.

Constructive waiver

The "constructive waiver" argument is more sophisticated.
It finds a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, not
in the initial cooperation of the defendant, but in the later plea
of insanity113 or offer of psychiatric evidence in support of that
plea. 1 4 A variation of this argument would penalize a defendant
who refuses to cooperate with the state's psychiatrist either by
disallowing the insanity defense altogether or by refusing to permit the defendant to present expert testimony on the insanity
issue.115
(i) Waiver by entry of insanity plea
The argument that one who enters a plea of insanity
thereby forfeits any right to silence at the ensuing psychiatric
examination is grounded on a notion of fairness. At first blush, it
seems unfair for a defendant to be able, as one court stated, to
"put in issue his want of mental capacity to commit the offense,
and in order to make his plea of want of capacity invulnerable,
prevent all inquiry into his mental state or condition." 1 But
when scrutinized, this unfairness argument is weak. A defendant
is entitled in most jurisdictions to invoke a number of affirmative defenses-for example self-defense, duress, or crime prevention-disproof of which may require the state to persuade the
jury that the defendant had a particular mental state. It is never
suggested that fairness requires that a defendant abandon the
privilege against self-incrimination with regard to these
defenses.
In cases of self-defense and other affirmative defenses, the
burden is commonly on the defendant to produce some evidence
113.
note 106,
114.
Whitlow,
115.
116.

See, e.g., cases cited in Berry, supra note 24, at 938 n.104, and in Lefelt, supra
at 437 n.39.
See, e.g., cases cited in Lefelt, supra note 106, at 437 n.40. See also State v.
45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965).
See, e.g., WiS. STAT. ANN. § 971.16(3) (1970).
State v. Cerar, 60 Utah 208, 220, 207 P. 597, 602 (1922).
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tending to establish the defense. '1 7 This procedural requirement
frequently does accomplish de facto a waiver of the privilege because normally the defendant must testify in order to carry his
or her burden of production. Once the defendant takes the
stand, the privilege against self-incrimination is waived. But
waiver does not always occur and when it occurs, is not always
total. The burden of producing some evidence related to selfdefense, for example, often can be satisfied by the testimony of a
person other than the defendant-a bystander or even the victim. Moreover, any waiver induced by assigning a burden of production to the defendant is a waiver only of the right to remain
silent at trial; it confers on the prosecution no privilege to examine the defendant extrajudicially and to introduce admissions
thereby obtained." 8
The burden-of-production point does suggest, however, a
remedy for whatever unfairness might result from permitting a
defendant to invoke the insanity defense and then to sit on the
evidence that the state needs to refute it. Recent United States
Supreme Court decisions indicate there is no constitutional obstacle to placing on a criminal defendant the burden of persuasion as to affirmative defenses." 9 Allocating that burden to the
defendant who pleads insanity avoids imposing on the state a
burden that unavailability of expert evidence about the defendant's mental state would prevent it from carrying. Although the
need to carry the burden of persuasion with respect to insanity
may put pressure on the defendant to submit to psychiatric examination by an expert retained by the defense-whose testimony may in turn entitle the prosecution to examine the defendant- 20 such strategic pressures have never been recognized as
117.

See e.g., COLO. REV.

STAT.

§§ 18-1-407; 18-1-710 (1973); ILL.

STAT. ANN.

ch. 38,

§§ 3-2; 7-14 (1975); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 2.03; tit. 2, § 9.02 (Vernon 1974).
118.

Nor can a meritorious argument be made that the insanity defense ought to

be treated differently from other affirmative defenses because it calls into question the
mental state of the defendant. First, the insanity defense should not be regarded as a
negation of one of the mental elements of the offense, but rather as a "confession and
avoidance"-an excuse extrinsic to the elements of the offense exactly like self-defense
or duress. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 706 (1975) (concurring opinion) ("[A]
defendant who sought to establish . . . insanity, and thereby escape any punishment
whatever for a heinous crime should bear the laboring oar on such an issue."). Second,
regarding insanity as a negation of an element of the prosecution's case instead of as an
affirmative defense would seem to heighten, rather than eliminate, the objection to use of
the defendant as a source of evidence by which sanity might be established.
119. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); see Walker v. Butterworth, 599
F.2d 1074 (1st Cir. 1979).
120. See text accompanying notes 127-33 infra.
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violations of the privilege against self-incrimination.' Hence an
allocation of the burden of persuasion concerning insanity to the
defendant in a criminal case is a constitutional method for
avoiding "unfairness" to the state in such cases.
The case of Williams v. Florida 22 is sometimes invoked to
support the view that the privilege against self-incrimination is
not violated when the state exacts the defendant's cooperation
in a psychiatric examination as a condition of entering an insanity plea. In Williams, a defendant challenged his conviction
on the ground that he had been required to disclose the identities and addresses of his alibi witnesses prior to trial, on pain of
losing the opportunity to present his alibi at trial. The Court
rejected his argument because the state could have achieved precisely the same advantage by other means. 23 It may be argued
that Williams establishes that the state may attach conditions
to the privilege of invoking a defense, including the condition
that a defendant claiming insanity cooperate with a court-ordered psychiatric examination. But the Williams decision did
not go that far. The Court emphasized that there was no difference between what Williams had been required to disclose and
what he conceded he would eventually have disclosed-the identity of his alibi witnesses. The requirement of advance disclosure
was merely one of timing. 2 4 A compelled psychiatric examination is obviously different; it might yield evidence that the defendant otherwise would never present. Moreover, although the
investigation of alibi witnesses following the disclosure of their
identities at trial would clearly be constitutional, requiring the
defendant's submission to a psychiatric examination during trial
would raise precisely the same self-incrimination difficulties that
it would raise before trial.' 5
121. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973) (jury instruction that permits inference of knowledge from unexplained possession of stolen mail does not violate
privilege against self-incrimination by pressuring defendant to testify).
122. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
123. Id. at 85-86. The prosecutor could have received a continuance after the appearance of the alibi Y/itnesses at trial, and then used the continuance period for investi-

gating and questioning, the witnesses. Williams conceded this technique would not have
violated his privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
124.

Id. at 85.

125. A more meritorious argument based on the Williams case is that the state
may require a defendant who plans to plead insanity to notify the prosecution both that
the plea will be made, as is often required, and of the identities of expert witnesses. The
prosecution might then seek to question or investigate these expert witnesses just as it
did the alibi witnesses in Williams. Cf. People v. Soma, 88 Mich. App. 364, 276 N.W.2d
892 (Ct. App. 1979) (holding constitutional the Michigan requirement that defendants
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Waiver by use of expert witnesses

A somewhat different argument may be made that the defendant who calls a psychiatrist as a defense witness waives the
privilege against self-incrimination and must submit to examination by a government psychiatrist, at least if the defense expert
bases his or her opinion on an examination of the defendant.
Under this theory the waiver would be predicated not on the
entry of the plea of insanity, but on the defendant's use of the
expert witness. The difficulty with this argument is that it would
condition one constitutional right-the right to call witnesses on
one's own behalf-- 126 on the relinquishment of another-the
privilege against self-incrimination. Nevertheless, many courts
have adopted this position1 27 and there is much to be said for it.
It is permissible to condition the exercise of the right to testify in one's own behalf on the surrender of at least some of the
protections of the privilege against self-incrimination. For example, although a defendant cannot be forced to testify at a criminal trial, if a defendant does elect to take the stand, that defendant must submit to cross-examination and answer any proper
question, even one whose answer might incriminate him or
her. 128 Moreover, in Harris v. New York, 12 9 the Court held that
extrajudicial statements elicited from a defendant in violation of
Miranda may be used to impeach the defendant's testimony at
trial, so long as those statements were not the products of compulsion or coercion. These two results suggest that when the invocation of the privilege would interfere significantly with the
prosecution's opportunity to subject the defendant's testimony
at trial to cross-examination, the privilege may have to yield.
The question then arises whether an invocation of the privilege
that interfered with a prosecutorial opportunity thoroughly to
cross-examine other defense witnesses should be permitted. Allowing an insanity defendant's experts to testify without giving
the prosecutor an opportunity to challenge the premises of their
conclusions, for example, by showing that the defendant made
statements inconsistent with those premises to other experts,
1 0
would create an obstacle to effective cross-examination. 8
pleading insanity furnish the prosecution
126. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
127. See note 114 supra.
128. See Johnson v. United States,
Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1896).
129. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
130. The form of cross-examination

with copies of defense psychiatrists' reports).
14, 18-19 (1967).
318 U.S. 189, 195 (1943) (dictum); Brown v.

sought by the prosecutor would be that which
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The question of whether a defendant's statements taken in
a manner which did not comply with the Miranda requirements
may be used to impeach or rebut witnesses other than the defendant has received surprisingly little attention from the courts. In
State v. Davis, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a noncomplying confession could not be used to rebut the testimony
of a defense alibi witness, resting its holding squarely on Miranda; the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari."3 '
That ruling is a sensible limitation of the Harris rule that noncomplying confessions may be used for impeachment. In Harris,
the Court justified permitting such impeachment of the defendant by observing that the privilege against self-incrimination
should not be converted into a license to commit perjury.1 2 No
such license is created by immunizing defense witnesses other
than the defendant from contradiction by the defendant's statement. It is unlikely that perjury by the witness will be the explanation for any discrepancy between the witness' in-court statement and the defendant's custodial admissions. Although
perjury is always a possibility, it is even more unlikely when the
defense witness is an expert and the facts to which that expert
testifies form the basis for the expert opinion.
On the other hand, a psychiatric expert witness is quite different from an alibi witness; the psychiatrist will be recounting
or relying on statements made by the defendant. Should a defendant's expert witness recount statements made by the defendant in an examination, it seems unfair to bar the prosecution
from showing that the defendant made contradictory statements
to other examiners. The prosecution would be seeking to use the
inconsistent statements to question the veracity of the defendant, not of the witness. Prohibiting this use of the defendant's
statements would promote the evil that the Harris rationale
sought to avoid: shielding possible falsehood from effective
cross-examination. Even if the defendant's psychiatrist did not
repeat the defendant's words, but based his or her conclusion on
them, a prohibition against prosecutorial use of the defendant's
statements in other examinations would deprive the prosecution
McCormick characterizes as impeachment by contradiction. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 47
(2d ed. 1972). The usual rule limits impeachment by contradiction by prohibiting it as to
collateral matters, id., but the facts that form the basis for a psychiatric opinion of sanity are unlikely to be found collateral.
131. 337 A.2d 33, 67 N.J. 222 (1975), cert. denied sub nor. New Jersey v. Pace, 425
U.S. 943 (1976).
132. 401 U.S. at 226.
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of the means of demonstrating that the defendant lied to or misled the defendant's own psychiatrist. 133 The argument that a defendant, by presenting an expert witness, constructively waives
the privilege as to inconsistent statements made in other psychiatric examinations is consistent with prior self-incrimination
doctrine.

13 4

Finally, it is important to examine present waiver practices
critically. Even if all the waiver arguments in the criminal context were persuasive, those arguments would not justify many
current practices. The "implicit waiver" argument would not
justify holding in contempt a defendant who entered such a plea
and then refused to cooperate with the psychiatrist. It is questionable whether any of the waiver arguments would justify confining a defendant involuntarily for the purpose of an examinatton. ' Indeed, it is not even clear that the waiver-by-plea or
waiver-by-witness arguments could support a rule barring an uncooperative defendant from pursuing an insanity plea or from
calling an expert witness. In Williams, although the Court found
no self-incrimination violation in the rule requiring the defendant to notify the state of the identity of alibi witnesses,3 6 the
issue was litigated by a defendant who had complied with the
notice requirement and had been subsequently convicted. The
Court noted that constitutional problems of greater substance
would arise in the case of one who refused to comply with the
133. The textual statement may be true only if the impeaching statements were
made voluntarily. Truly involuntary statements, as distinguished from those made
merely in the absence of Miranda warnings, probably cannot be introduced even for
impeachment purposes. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 224. Moreover, no waiver ought
be implied if the defendant's expert witness does not examine the defendant, but instead
testifies solely in response to hypothetical questions. In that situation, the expert is not
recounting or relying on statements made by the defendant.
134. The rule suggested in the text was described as "plausible" recently in Smith
v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 705 n.15 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Estelle v. Smith,
445 U.S. 926 (1980). The court in Smith upheld a defendant's privilege to exclude the
testimony of a psychiatrist who examined him while in custody, and who later testified
in support of a death penalty for the defendant. Distinguishing earlier Fifth Circuit cases
such as United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1976), which had permitted such
testimony in sanity trials, the court explained that the defendants in those cases had
presented their own psychiatric expert witnesses. The court continued, "we leave open
the possibility that a defendant who wishes to use psychiatric evidence in his own behalf
can be precluded. . . unless he is willing to be examined by a psychiatrist nominated by
the state." 602 F.2d at 705. See also Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1979).
135. In McNeil v. Patuxent, 407 U.S. 245 (1972), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an institution's policy of responding to an inmate's refusal to cooperate in a
psychiatric exam with a decision to prolong confinement until the inmate did cooperate.
136. See text accompanying notes 122-23 supra.
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notice requirement and consequently was barred from presenting witnesses at trial. 187
2.'

THE CIVIL COMMITMENT CONTEXT.

Waiver arguments will seldom be persuasive when the privilege against self-incrimination is claimed by a respondent in a
civil commitment proceeding. The Miranda result refutes the
claim that an accused criminal waives the privilege against selfincrimination merely by cooperating with a psychiatric examiner.1 80 The reasoning that led the Court to reject in Miranda
that notion of "implicit" waiver should be equally persuasive
when applied to a person facing a psychiatric evaluation that
could lead to civil commitment.
A respondent's dilemma is acute. Family or friends may
have found the respondent too difficult to live with; a law enforcement official may have arrested the respondent for antisocial or bizarre conduct; the respondent might have come voluntarily to a mental health facility only to find that he or she was
not free to leave. 3 9 In any event, the respondent will probably
be confined to the facility pending evaluation."1 0 Unlike many
criminal suspects, who can usually look forward to an early release on bail even if evidence of guilt is strong, mental health
respondents are unlikely to be freed unless they can convince an
examiner they are not mentally ill. Respondents' silence will be
used against them, as they will face a significant period of incarceration unless they can talk their way out. In some cases, respondents will not have been warned that their statements may
141
be the basis on which they eventually could be committed.
Under such circumstances, it would be perverse to imply a
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination from a respondent's choice not to meet an examiner's overtures with stony
silence.
137. 399 U.S. at 83 n.14 ("We emphasize that this case does not involve the question of he validity of the threatened sanction, had petitioner chosen not to comply with
the notice-of-alibi rule. Whether and to what extent a state can enforce discovery rules
against a defendant who fails to comply, by excluding relevant, probative evidence is a
question raising Sixth Amendment issues which we have no occasion to explore.").
138. See text accompanying notes 108-12 supra.
139. See Dix, Acute Psychiatric Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in the Metropolis: An EmpiricalStudy, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 485, 503-14 [hereinafter cited as Dix].
Professor Dix creates a typology of situations that trigger a psychiatric evaluation; the
three essential types are self-presentation, police presentation, and family presentation.
140. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
141. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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The civil commitment respondent, unlike the criminal defendant who mounts an insanity defense, has not entered any
"plea" that could possibly be construed as a waiver of whatever
privilege the respondent would otherwise enjoy. Nor will the respondent commonly call an expert witness. The respondent is
therefore not open to the charge of having constructively
"waived" the privilege. The state will have the burden of persuasion at the commitment hearing and will seldom have enough
evidence to make up a case-in-chief without the testimony of the
psychiatrist who conducted the official interview. In some commitment hearings the state might nevertheless succeed in carrying its initial burden without the benefit of testimony concerning the interview, for example with the evidence of family,
neighbors, or police officers.14 2 In such a hearing, a waiver argument might be raised. If the respondent called an expert witness
at the close of the state's case, the state could thereafter claim
that it was entitled to offer evidence from the interview with its
expert in rebuttal because the respondent's presentation waived
the privilege against self-incrimination. Only in such cases-and
they would be rare-would any of the waiver arguments justify
overruling a respondent's self-incrimination claim.
C.

The "Civil Proceeding" Explanation

The real-testimonial and waiver explanations are most often
put forward as explanations of why a criminal defendant pleading insanity may not claim the privilege against self-incrimination as to statements made to a psychiatrist. Those explanations
are sometimes borrowed as we have seen, to justify a court's refusal to recognize the privilege in civil commitment proceedings.
A third explanation relies not on any analogy to the criminal
process, but rather on the differences between a criminal trial
and a civil commitment proceeding.
Many courts claim that the privilege against self-incrimination is unavailable in civil commitment cases because the fifth
amendment provides only that no person shall be compelled in a
criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself.14 8 The
significance of this distinction does not lie in any inapplicability
of the fifth amendment in civil proceedings; it has long been rec142. Regarding the admissibility and desirability of expert evidence on the issue of
mental illness, see Judge Bazelon's comments in Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d
269, 270-71 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
143. See note 23 supra.
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ognized that the privilege may be invoked in any forum if exacting an answer would subject the answerer to the risk of a criminal conviction."' Rather, the explanation is that the privilege is
available only to one who seeks by invoking it to avoid criminal
conviction, 14 5 rather than a civil judgment of commitment.

The significance of the civil-criminal distinction initially
46
seemed to have been diminished by the case of In re Gault.1
Gault was a juvenile facing a judicial proceeding, labeled "civil,"
designed to determine whether he was a juvenile delinquent.
Part of the \evidence adduced at the delinquency hearing consisted of accounts of his confessions and the confessions themselves.147 Despite the state's argument that Gault's statements
subjected him only to the risk of adjudication as a delinquent
and admission to a training school,148 the Court held that the
privilege prevented the use of a juvenile's statements against the
juvenile in a delinquency proceeding in the absence of clear
proof that the juvenile had waived the right to remain silent.14 9
Justice Fortas, in writing the Court's opinion, explained
that "the availability of the privilege does not turn upon the
type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon
the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure
which it invites."' 50 The opinion emphasized that because an adjudication of delinquency could lead to involuntary confinement
in a state institution, juvenile proceedings "must be regarded as
'criminal' for purposes of the privilege against self144. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963).
145. See, e.g., Cramer v. Tyars, 23 Cal. 3d 131, 588 P.2d 793, 151 Cal. Rptr. 653
(1979).
146. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
147. Id. at 7.
148. See id. at 49.
149. Id. at 55. The Gault case was decided just one term after the Miranda decision. The opinions reflected the still-lively disagreements among the Justices about the
correctness and scope of Miranda. Justice White, concurring in all but the self-incrimination portion of the majority opinion, reiterated his dissent from Miranda. He warned
that measuring Gault's possible waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination by the
exacting standards of Miranda was inappropriate, in part because of the juvenile context
and in part because Gault's hearing predated the Miranda decision. Perhaps in consequence of the complications of timing and the persistent division of the Court on the
Miranda question, the majority opinion was vague on the precise application of the Miranda waiver requirements to juvenile proceedings. It conceded that there may be "special problems" with respect to the waiver of the privilege by juveniles, and that there
may be some "differences in technique-but not in principle" between securing the
waiver from adults on the one hand and juveniles on the other. 387 U.S. at 55.
150. Id. at 49.
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incrimination." 151
.The most important language of the Gault opinion confronted the traditional argument that juvenile proceedings and
dispositions ought not be viewed as criminal in nature because
of their benevolent intentions and their therapeutic possibilities.
Justice Fortas was forthrightly skeptical about those claims. 5
His opinion relied upon studies and reports that stressed the punitive and hostile character of the juvenile court system and institutions-sources he described as "current reappraisals of the
rhetoric and realities of the handling of juvenile offenders."'' 3
With respect to interrogation practices, the opinion remarked
that "evidence is accumulating that confessions by juveniles do
not aid in 'individualized treatment' . . . and that compelling
the child to answer questions, without warning or advice as to
his right to remain silent, does not serve this or any other good
1 4
purpose."'
The Court followed the Gault decision with its ruling three
years later in In re Winship. 5' The Winship opinion held that
in juvenile proceedings, just as in criminal proceedings, the
United States Constitution requires the state to prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt, at least if the gravamen of the delinquency charge is the commission of a specified criminal act.' 6 In
151. Id. The opinion went on to remark that, in many states, adjudicated delinquents find their way into adult penal institutions through transfer procedures or initial
placement. Also, some juvenile courts are authorized by statute to transfer a juvenile to
criminal court. Thus, the Court reasoned that there could be no assurance that statements made by a juvenile would not in fact finally contribute to the juvenile's conviction
as a criminal. Yet neither of these possibilities seemed essential to the Court's equation
of juvenile proceedings to criminal trials for self-incrimination purposes. The prospect
that a juvenile transferred to criminal court might suffer from the admission of an incriminating statement could be eliminated by a rule that would require the statement's
exclusion in the criminal proceeding; the occasional mixing of juveniles and convicts in
facilities seems irrelevant. No one would argue, for example, that an adult accused who
faced at worst incarceration in a minimal security, country club like facility should therefore lose the privilege against self-incrimination. The converse proposition, that juveniles
need the privilege only because of the possibility that they may be confined in unpleasant surroundings, also misses the point of the self-incrimination clause. The Court noted
that "the commendable principles relating to the processing and treatment of juveniles
separately from adults are in no way involved or affected by the procedural issues under
discussion." Id. at 22.
152. Id. at 17-28.
153. Id. at 51.
154. Id.
155. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
156. Id. at 368. The limitation is significant because in some jurisdictions juveniles
can be found delinquent because of conduct, like truancy, that would not be criminal if
committed by an adult. Whether such charges must be proved beyond a reasonable
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Winship the Court rejected for the second time the argument
that juvenile proceedings are benevolent, therapeutic, and therefore civil in nature. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan
stated, "civil labels and good intentions do not themselves obviate the need
for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile
7
15

courts."'

Gault and Winship seemed to be bellwethers of the Court's
enthusiasm for imposing all of the reforms of the due process
"revolution" on juvenile courts as well as criminal courts. These
cases provided encouragement to those who argued that mental
health proceedings, also "civil" by label but capable of leading to
involuntary confinement, should incorporate "criminal" due process safeguards. The picture was clouded, however, by the 1971
decision of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania.158 In McKeiver, the

Court for the first time expressly refused to require that a procedural safeguard constitutionally required in criminal proceedings
be afforded equally to juveniles facing delinquency adjudications. The Court had held in 1968 that the right to jury trial
must be afforded in all state criminal trials for non-petty offenses.15 9 In McKeiver, however, it declined to find a similar
constitutional guarantee for juveniles in delinquency proceedings. The contrast between Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion
and the opinions in Gault and Winship is striking. Although the
Winship opinion cavalierly rejected the "good-faith", "therapeutic," "non-penal," "flexible" claims made on behalf of the juvenile courts as a justification for decreased procedural formality, 60 McKeiver seemed to endorse those same claims.
Justice Blackmun's opinion rejected the equation of a juvenile proceeding to a criminal trial, stating that such an equation
"chooses to ignore . . .every aspect of fairness, of concern, of

sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system contemplates."'' In response to reminders of its earlier criticism of the distance between the juvenile system's rhetoric and
its reality, Justice Blackmun replied coolly: "Of course there
have been abuses. .

.

.We refrain from saying at this point that

those abuses are of constitutional dimension. They relate to the
lack of resources and of dedication rather than to inherent undoubt is
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

not addressed in Winship. See id. at 359 n.1.
Id. at 365-66.
403 U.S. 528 (1971).
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
See text accompanying note 157 supra.
403 U.S. at 550.
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fairness."' 2 This startling reversal of direction produced chaos
in the state of constitutional juvenile law. McKeiver also weakened the argument that procedural protections analogous to
those of the criminal process ought to be available to mental
health respondents.
Recently, the Court has spoken more directly to the issue of
whether the claimed "civil" character of mental health proceedings ought to justify diluting in such proceedings the procedural
formalities required in criminal trials. In Addington v. Texas, 6 '
the Court faced the question of whether to impose the Winship
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in state civil
commitment proceedings. The Addington Court refused to require the use of the criminal burden of persuasion, but it indicated in strong dicta that the use of the ordinary civil "preponderance" standard would violate due process. Chief Justice
Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, distinguished mental
health proceedings from both criminal trials on the one hand
and ordinary civil adjudications on the other. Observing that
civil commitment entails both a loss of liberty and serious adverse social consequences for respondents, the Court concluded
that the respondent cannot be expected to "share equally with
society the risk of error"'" 4 and that accordingly the preponderance standard is insufficient.'" The Court was equally emphatic,
however, that the prospect of loss of liberty and social standing
was not justification for imposing the criminal burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. In mental health proceedings, the
Court announced, the state must prove its case by the intermediate standard of "clear and convincing evidence."'"
Despite the fact that mental health proceedings have many
similarities to the delinquency proceedings in which the Gault
and Winship Courts required adherence to criminal procedural
standards, the Addington opinion emphasized four differences
between civil commitment and criminal proceedings. First, state
162. Id. at 547-48.
163. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
164. Id. at 427.
165. Id. at 423-27.
166. Id. at 433. The nearest historical analog to the test formulated by the Court is
the "clear, unequivocal and convincing" standard that it has required in deportation
hearings, see Woodby v. I.N.S., 385 U.S. 276 (1967). The Court notes in Addington, however, that the "unequivocal" requirement matches or exceeds the reasonable doubt standard. Interestingly, the Court long ago assumed that the privilege against self-incrimination would be available to a respondent-witness in a deportation proceeding. See
Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103 (1927).
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power in civil commitment proceedings is not, according to the
Court, "exercised in a punitive sense. ' 167 The Court stated flatly
that civil commitment proceedings can "in no sense be equated
to . . . criminal prosecution[s].' 6 Second, the tragedy of erroneous confinement need not be so great a concern in mental
health proceedings as in criminal ones, because "layers of professional review" and the "concern of the family and friends" act as
additional safeguards against the risk of erroneous confinement. 69 Third, the dangers of an erroneous decision against confinement are greater in civil commitment than in criminal trials,
since the release of an individual genuinely in need of treatment
is injurious to that individual in a way that the acquittal of a
person genuinely deserving of criminal sanctions is not. Hence,
it "cannot be said . . . that it is much better for a mentally ill
person to 'go free' than for a mentally normal person to be committed.' 7 0° Finally, the opinion found that the central inquiry in
a mental health proceeding is quite different from the focus of
the criminal or delinquency hearing. The issue in a criminal case
is whether the accused committed the criminal act. The question
in a commitment proceeding is, on the other hand, a more delicate investigation of whether the respondent is mentally ill and
a danger to self or others-an investigation, according to the
Court, that depends not on facts, but on "the meaning of the
7
facts.' '
The Court's reasoning in the Addington decision is less than
compelling. Its first observation, that commitment has no "punitive" aspect, seems both naive and irrelevant. Empirical evidence has indicated that commitment frequently follows an encounter with law enforcement officials and is viewed by them as
simply an alternative disposition to jailing or some more conventional "criminal" sanction. 17 2 The rehabilitative, deterrent, and
incapacitative justifications for the imposition of criminal punishment overlap the most significant reasons for civil commitment. Even if commitment is less "punitive" than criminal im167. 441 U.S. at 428.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 428-29.
170. Id. at 429.
171. Id. (emphasis added).
172. See, e.g., Dix, supra note 139, at 504-09. Among Professor Dix's findings is the
statistic that in St. Louis the police, with or without the cooperation of the subject's
family, participated in over 60% of all involuntary admissions to an acute psychiatric
facility. Id. at 503. See also Bittner, Police Discretion in Emergency Apprehension of
Mentally Ill Persons, 14 Soc. PRoB. 278 (1966).
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prisonment because it is thought not to involve the retributive
motive, that distinction certainly cannot serve to justify different treatment between mental health respondents and accused
juvenile delinquents. Each faces involuntary confinement "for
his own good," rather than for some explicitly vengeful purpose.
Yet the reality is that mental patients, no less than juvenile delinquents, may experience their confinement as a deeply punishing period and may in fact be the victims of harsh or cruel
17

treatment.

-

Second, the Court's argument that layers of professional review and the concern of family and friends lessen the opportunity for serious errors in favor of commitment is similarly at
odds with the evidence. Studies indicate that the decision to go
forward with commitment proceedings is often made at a time
when little information is available, and is seldom reviewed
thereafter.1 74 Family and friends are often the instigators of
commitment proceedings.175 Psychiatric intervention is for them
a way of dealing with a complex social situation not susceptible
of other solutions. Many studies suggest that an individual in a
social network who becomes identified by others as "sick" is not
necessarily
the individual
most in need of psychiatric services.7 6
These two factors
in combination
suggest that the probability of

173. See, e.g., Hearings on the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons, Subcomm.
on the Constitution, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 17, 22,
23, 30, and July 1, 1977) at 8-18 (Testimony of Drew S. Days, III), 52-70 (testimony of
Geraldo Rivera) (book entered as exhibit), 74-75 (testimony of Dr. Michael Wilkins), 7577 (testimony of Bernard Carabello), 129-77 (testimony of Wendell Rawls, Jr. & Acel
Moore), 372-80 (testimony of Dr. James Clements); B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY
(1972); E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961) [hereinafter cited as GOFFMAN]; R. PERUCCI, CIRCLE
OF MADNESS: ON BEING INSANE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED IN AMERICA (1974); C. STEIR, BLUE
JOLTS: TRUE STORIES FROM THE CUCKOO'S NEST

(1978). See also the Frederick Wiseman

film "Titicut Follies" for a shocking documentary on conditions in a Bridgewater, Massachusetts institution for the criminally insane.
174. See Dix, supra note 139, at 502-37. Professor Dix reports that in the facility
he studied, the initial admission decision was made after about four minutes of observation and examination. Although the decision was supposed to be reviewed at a later
"staffing", Dix reports that he observed no case in which the staffing resulted in a reversal of the admission decision. Id. at 521, 534. See also Mechanic, Some Factorsin Identifying and Defining Mental Illness, 46 MENTAL HYGIENE 66, 69 (1962) ("The layman usually assumes that his conception of 'mental illness' is not the important definition since
the psychiatrist is the expert and presumably makes the final decision. On the contrary,
community persons are brought to the hospital on the basis of lay definitions, and once
they arrive, their appearance alone is usually regarded as sufficient evidence of,
'illness'.").
175. See id. at 504 Table 1; Slovenko, supra note 7, at 13 (70% of all petitioners in
mental health cases are family members).
176. Polak, The Crisis of Admission, 2 Soc. PSYCH. 150, 151-53 (1967).
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committing a person who ought not be committed is at least as
great as the probability of an erroneous criminal conviction, burdens of proof being equal. To increase the differential risks by
imposing a lower standard of proof in commitment cases seems
perverse.
The Court's third distinction-that the hazards that attend
erroneous release of a confined person are so great that it is better to confine an inappropriate subject than to release a needy
one-suffers like its first distinction from the flaw that it cannot
be used to differentiate juvenile offenders from mentally ill persons. This treatment premise underlies both juvenile and mental
health confinement, however, it is not suggested that the plight
of the juvenile who needs treatment but does not receive it is so
tragic that we ought to relax the burden of proof in juvenile proceedings. 177 Moreover, there is a significant risk that the involuntary confinement of an alleged mentally ill person for whom
confinement is inappropriate will result in serious harm to that
person."' Conversely, studies show that there is a large, or at
least moderate, rate of spontaneous remission among the mentally ill.' 79 Such remissions decrease the prospect of harm to
those who avoid commitment because of an excessively stringent
standard of proof. The disturbed person who is not institutionalized may agree to accept psychiatric services on an out-patient
basis; such a treatment plan is the therapy of choice in many
cases. 1 0 For these reasons, the Court's conclusion that over-infstitutionalization is preferable to under-institutionalization
seems unexamined at best. This expressed preference may, however, be the most important clue to the Court's attitude toward
177. Although other guarantees, such as trial by jury, may be subordinated to the
therapeutic purposes of the juvenile court, see text accompanying notes 158-62 supra,
the Court held in Winship that burden-of-proof issues were not properly weighed against
beneficent purposes.
178. See generally GOFFMAN, supra note 173; Chambers, Alternatives to Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill: PracticalGuides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70
MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1127-33 (1972); Rosenhan, supra note 69.
179. In a 1952 study, H. Eysenck concluded after reviewing much research that
mental patients receiving little or no treatment were quite as likely to recover as patients
undergoing extensive treatment. Eysenck, The Effects of Psychotherapy:An Evaluation,
16 J. CONSULT. PSYCH. 319 (1952). Eysenck's study has been criticized, but even his critics concede a substantial incidence of spontaneous remission. See Langsley, Machotka, &
Flomenhaft, Avoiding Mental Hospital Admission: A Follow-Up Study, 127 AM. J.
PsycH. 1391 (1971).
180. See FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 475 ("There is also good evidence that, for a
substantial number of cases [of schizophrenia], day care or home care is a practical and

effective alternative to hospital care").
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the mental health system provided by the Addington opinion.1 81
Even less satisfactory is the Court's final explanation, that
the non-factual, interpretive focus of the commitment hearing
justifies abandoning the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Criminal trials do not, as the Court suggested, revolve
exclusively around the question: "Did the accused commit the
acts he is said to have committed?" Acts are only one element of
a crime; with few exceptions they must be accompanied by some
mental correlate-such as intention, knowledge, or recklessness-in order to render the actor a criminal.1 8 Determining
whether the requisite mental state was present requires-no less
than does the determination of whether a person is mentally
ill-interpretation, inference, and to a certain degree, speculation. Many criminal verdicts turn upon the jury's view of such
questions as the "reasonableness" of the defendant's conduct or
8
perceptions' ssurely
matters more of interpretation and judgment than of strict fact-finding.
The most credible explanation for the Court's willingness to
accept less proof in mental health proceedings is the fear, expressed in Addington, that the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt could not be met in the vast majority of commitment proceedings. The Court observed that, "[t]he subtleties
and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render certainties virtually
beyond reach in most situations." 8 ' The Court evidently feared
that because of these uncertainties, imposing a reasonable doubt
requirement would allow many patients needing treatment to
avoid that treatment. 185 Addington signaled the Court's unwillingness to risk that result.18 e
181.
182.

See notes 184-86 infra and accompanying text.
See LAFAVE & ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 218-23 (1972); see gener-

ally Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958); Packer,
Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107; Strong, The Predicates of
Criminal Liability, 1980 Wis. L. Rzv. 441.
183. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.4, 2.02(2)(d).
184. 441 U.S. at 430.
185. Id.
186. In a decision released shortly after Addington, the Court again expressed confidence in the judgment of medical professionals, and fear that adversary-like protections

in a mental health context would make the rehabilitative process more difficult. In
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), Chief Justice Burger rejected the plaintiffs' claim
that children who are admitted to mental institutions at the request of their parents
should enjoy the procedural protections, such as hearings before an impartial tribunal,
that have long been available to adults. The Chief Justice said "[w]hat is best for a child
is an individual medical decision that must be left to the judgment of physicians in each
case," id. at 608, and that "there is a serious risk that an adversary confrontation will
adversely affect the ability of the parents to assist the child while in the hospital." Id. at
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In summary, the United States Supreme Court has in recent
cases, rejected the position that constitutional procedural formalities are required only in criminal cases. It has not, however,
emhraced the polar position that any proceeding that might result in a loss of liberty requires the same safeguards as those
provided in criminal cases. Moreover, after strong initial skepticism about enforced therapy, the Court lately has turned a more
sympathetic ear toward proponents of therapy.1 87 The Court
clearly views the danger that those who need treatment may not
be treated as at least as significant as the converse danger of
confinement of those for whom confinement is unnecessary.
Each of these attitudes may influence the Court's eventual view
of the applicability of the self-incrimination clause in mental
health proceedings.
The outcome in a pending case may shortly reveal more
about the Court's willingness to recognize a privilege against
self-incrimination in proceedings other than criminal trials.
Smith v. Estelle, ss in which certiorari has been granted, concerns the applicability of the privilege at the sentencing stage of
a criminal proceeding. The defendant in Smith had cooperated
in an interview with a court-appointed psychiatrist at a time
when his competency to stand trial was in question.189 Found
competent, Smith -went to trial on a capital charge and was convicted. At the penalty stage of the trial, the jury was asked to
determine, inter alia, whether Smith was likely to commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society. The psychiatrist who had conducted the competency examination testified that in his opinion Smith was a dangerous
610. The Court also feared that imposing procedural formalities would deter parents
from seeking hospitalization for their children. Id. at 620. Although generalizing from
two decisions is risky, one cannot escape the impression that the Court has begun to
choose sides, after remaining neutral for quite a while, between the "civil libertarian"
and the "therapeutic state" factions of the debate over civil commitment.

Unlike Addington, Parham, drew three dissents. The dissenters argued that children
might well require more procedural protection than adults, since "[t]he consequences of

an erroneous commitment decision are more tragic where children are involved", and
"the chances of an erroneous commitment decision are particularly great where children
are involved." Id. at 627-29. See also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)(plurality opin-

ion)(notice, hearing, counsel, and opportunity for cross-examination must be afforded
prisoner facing transfer to a mental health institution).
187. One of the authorities cited by Chief Justice Burger in the Addington opinion

is Chodoff, The Case for Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 133 AM. J.
PSYCH. 496 (1976). 441 U.S. at 429.

188. 602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. grantedsub noma.Estelle v. Smith, 445 U.S.
926 (1980).
189. 602 F.2d at 696.
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sociopath who would continue to commit crimes. 190 The jury

then answered the question in the affirmative, resulting in the
imposition of the death penalty. In a subsequent habeas corpus
proceeding, the Fifth Circuit held that because Smith had not
been warned of a right to remain silent when confronted by the
psychiatrist's probings, his privilege against self-incrimination
was violated by the use of the psychiatrist's testimony at the
sentencing hearing.'9 1
One of the questions posed by this result is whether the
privilege should be available at all in the sentencing stage-as
distinct from the guilt-or-innocence stage-of a criminal trial.
The Court has held that sentencing should not normally be regarded as a "criminal" proceeding for purposes of some constitutional protections, including the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, 19' and the right to trial by jury.1as On the other
hand, the Court has found that the due process clause requires
that certain sentencing decisions be made only after a hearing in
which certain procedural protections are afforded the defendant.'" An affirmance of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Smith
might indicate the Court's continued commitment to the position taken in In re Gault that the privilege against self-incrimination, or a generalized due process version of it, must be available to the individual who seeks by invoking the privilege to
avoid a serious penalty other than criminal conviction.1" Such a
190. Id. at 697-98.
191. Id. at 708.
192. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
193. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) ("This Court ... has never suggested
that jury sentencing is constitutionally required." Id. at 252).
194. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (convicted defendant facing
death penalty entitled to access to presentence report); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605
(1967) (convicted defendant facing enhancement of sentence under special sex offender
statute must be afforded right to counsel).
195. On the other hand, affirmance could have alternative explanations that imply
no view on the issue of the privilege against self-incrimination in civil commitment. It
may be that the Court believes that death penalty cases are sui generis; if so, no conclusions may be drawn regarding the application of the doctrines enunciated in such cases
to other situations. Compare Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (no constitutional right to access to presentence reports) with Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349
(1977) (rule of Williams does not apply in death penalty cases). Or the Court might
recognize the privilege in sentencing contexts but refuse to extend its reasoning to the
more "therapeutic" mental health setting. See text accompanying notes 143-81 supra.
Finally, the Court might affirm Smith on the basis of agreement with the Fifth Circuit's
independent alternative holding that the prosecutors unfairly surprised Smith's attorneys by failing, in violation of a pretrial order, to disclose their intention to call the
psychiatrist at the sentencing hearing. See 602 F.2d at 699-703.
In a recent Supreme Court decision, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall
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holding would make more likely the Court's eventual recognition
of a privilege against self-incrimination for mental health
respondents.
III.

THE CONTOURS OF THE PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL COMMITMENT

I have argued that of the three explanations most often
given for the law's failure to afford a privilege against self-incrimination to mental health respondents-the real-testimonial
explanation, the waiver explanation, and the civil proceeding explanation-the first two are unsatisfactory. Those two explanations are often misused in the context of criminal insanity proceedings, and provide even less justification for disregarding the
privilege in civil commitment cases. The third explanation,
which argues that the privilege does not apply to a noncriminal
proceeding like civil commitment, is lent surface plausibility by
the Court's refusal in Addington to equate civil commitment to
criminal conviction for burden-of-persuasion purposes.
Yet Addington should not be read as a proclamation that
none of the procedural protections fashioned for criminal trials
need be observed in civil commitment. The Court's tone in Addington is a pragmatic one; it does not intend to require any procedure that would interfere significantly with the therapeutic
aims of the mental health system. On the other hand, the Court
evidently is willing to require certain quasi-criminal protections,
for example the requirement of proof by clear and convincing
evidence articulated in Addington, as a matter of due process.
The guiding principle seems to be ensuring the maximum procedural protections for the subjects of civil commitment to the degree those protections are consistent with the therapeutic goals
of the mental health system. Hence any inquiry into the extent
to which the privilege against self-incrimination should be
respected in civil commitment proceedings must take into account the workings and goals of the commitment system and the
degree of interference that recognition of the privilege would
impose.
I will propose that a privilege against self-incrimination,
says "There can be no doubt that a judge would be barred from increasing the length of
a jail sentence because of a defendant's refusal to cooperate based on the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination". Roberts v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1358, 1367

(1980). The majority opinion seems to accept this premise, qualifying it only by holding
that the self-incrimination basis for the defendant's silence must be explicitly articulated
by the defendant. Hence the Court may already have recently reaffirmed the proposition
in the text.
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similar but not identical to the privilege recognized in criminal
settings, be afforded to civil commitment respondents. Further, I
will argue that affording such a privilege will not significantly
hamper, and may even further, achievement of the therapeutic
goals of civil commitment.
A.

Temporary Detention

Civil commitment is most often initiated because an individual's erratic behavior has come to the attention of mental
health or law enforcement authorities or, less frequently, a
court. 1 " A decision in favor of indeterminate or relatively
lengthy commitment is nearly always preceded by a brief period
of temporary detention designed to accomplish both crisis intervention and evaluation. 1 97 It is during this initial period that
most of the issues addressed in this article arise in practice. To
the extent that this brief period of interference in an individual's life successfully resolves an immediate crisis-and certainly
a substantial number of such interventions do lead to some resolution that makes further involuntary proceedings unnecessary 95 -requiring an elaborate system of warnings seems formalistic. More important, requiring Miranda-type warnings
might contribute to the creation of an adversary atmosphere
that would discourage the subject and therapist from finding a
mutually acceptable solution to the crisis. 19 ' For these reasons it
seems misguided to require, as do some courts 00 and some statutes, 20 1 that as a matter of due process every temporary detention must be accompanied by such warnings.
A better solution is to distinguish, for purposes of the privilege, between the two somewhat antagonistic purposes of the
temporary detention period: crisis resolution and evaluation for
possible commitment. On the one hand, requiring an examiner
to warn all respondents that anything they say may be used in
196.
197.
198.

See Dix, supra note 139, at 503-14.
See note 17 supra.
See Brakel & Rock, supra note 5, at 47 ("[Mlany if not most patients can be

effectively treated and even released in a relatively short period of time. Thus temporary
involuntary hospitalization may be all that is necessary to treat the patient successfully
or at least prepare him to elect to continue treatment as a voluntary patient.").
199. See, e.g., Rapaport, Editorial: "Belegaled," 5 BULL. OF AM. ACAD. OF PSYCH.&
L. iv (1977) ("[O]ne must warn the patient, and possibly scare him, before ministering to
him.").
200. E.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414
U.S. 473 (1974).
201. See note 18 supra.
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evidence at a commitment hearing might interfere with a noncoercive resolution of the immediate crisis. On the other hand, basic fairness requires such warnings when it is true that a respondent's statements may be so used. It is no solution to pretend
that these antagonistic elements are -not present. Instead, what
is needed is a period during which it can truthfully be represented to a respondent that none of the respondent's statements
will be used in a commitment proceeding.
Subject to fourth amendment concerns about probable
cause, 20 2 it seems reasonable to permit mental health authorities
to detain a person for a very brief period-a maximum of fortyeight hours, for instance-as a method of crisis intervention.
Just as it is tolerable to use arrest and brief detention in the
criminal justice system for the resolution pf such crises as domestic assault and disorderly conduct, it should be tolerable to
put the mental health system to the same use.20 8 A person behaving in a bizarre or threatening, as opposed to an eccentric,
manner, poses a hazard to the peace of the community, and conceivably to himself or herself. Our respect for individual freedom
need not preclude us from intervention.2 0 4 The offensive aspects
of the mental health system arise when an individual is tricked
or coerced into cooperating in a procedure that may culminate
in lengthy imprisonment.
Unlike the accused criminal, the person suspected of being
202. See In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
203. This article does not consider the value objections to the use of the mental
health system as a social control agent analogous to the justice system. It can be argued,
however, that 'there should be significant differences between the two systems and that it
is not tolerable to put the mental health laws to the same social control uses to which
society puts the criminal laws. See Dershowitz, Psychiatry in The Legal Process: "A
Knife that Cuts Both Ways", in A. SUTHERLAND, THE PATH OF THE LAW FROM 1967, at
71-83 (1968); Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justificationsfor Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75, 78-79 (1968). Nevertheless, regardless of any philosophical
objections, society does put the mental health system and the justice system to similar
behavior control uses. My proposal neither depends on nor requires the abandonment of
this practice.
204. There are, of course, theorists who reject both the parens patriae and the police power justifications for civil commitment. The best-known is Dr. Thomas Szasz,
whose considerable writings characterize institutional psychiatry as a means of repressing pdlitical or cultural nonconformists. See, e.g., T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY & PSYCHIATRY (1963); T. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961). Other criticisms of involuntary psychiatric treatment are found in N. KIrrRE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT (1971);

R.D.

LAING, THE

POLITICS OF

EXPERIENCE

(1967). One certainly need not accept the abo-

litionist views of these critics in order to accept my proposal; indeed, they would probably regard my proposal as an insufficient curb of the powers of the mental health system.
See text accompanying notes 215-23 infra.
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mentally ill does not enjoy a right to bail; this dissimilarity exacerbates the self-incrimination dilemma.0 6 But rather than mimicking the criminal justice system by coupling a right to bail
with a right to other procedural cautions and rights during the
initial detention period, the mental health system can formulate
a more appropriate solution to the self-incrimination problem. I
propose a solution which has two aspects. First, no statements
made by a respondent during the initial detention period shall
be admissible in a subsequent proceeding for involuntary hospitalization. Second, the initial detention period shall not exceed
forty-eight hours, a period which seems a reasonable duration
for the resolution of an immediate crisis.
Prohibiting the use of a respondent's early statements is
both broader and narrower than the criminal exclusionary rule.
The prohibition is broader because it does not permit a waiver
of the right to remain silent at the time the statement is made.
This rule renders Miranda-type warnings as unnecessary as they
are inappropriate. At the same time, the prohibition is narrower
than an accused criminal's privilege; it does not imply that an
examiner who questions an individual without a waiver has violated any constitutional rights.e The questioning and the statement are perfectly appropriate, but they may only be used for
crisis intervention and for therapeutic purposes. Any subsequent
attempt to introduce the statements or an examiner's opinion
based on them at an involuntary commitment proceeding would
run afoul of the rule.
Under this proposed rule, many cases will be resolved, as
they are now, during the initial detention period. An examiner
and respondent frequently negotiate a mutually acceptable plan
of therapy. 0 7 In fact, such nonadversarial solutions may increase
under this rule because the examiner will be able to encourage
the trust and the confidences of a respondent with truthful assurances that the respondent's statements will remain
confidential. 0 8
205. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
206. This limitation would preclude a suit for damages against the professional
who questions a respondent without administering warnings. See Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing a damage remedy for violations of the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures).
207. See note 198 supra.
208. This system would also remove any need for the presence of lawyers at initial
psychiatric interviews, a presence that is anathema to mental health professionals. A
number of courts have stated that the presence of a lawyer at a psychiatric interview
interferes with the diagnostic and therapeutic process. See United States v. Bohle, 445
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After the initial temporary detention period elapses, if the
examiner has failed to persuade the respondent to enter therapy

voluntarily and believes that involuntary commitment proceedings are necessary, the process clearly will have become adversarial. At this point, it is appropriate to require many of the
same protections for the respondent that are afforded to a crimi-

nal defendant. In particular, it is not tolerable to confine the respondent simply as a technique for allowing the state to build a
case for commitment. Continued confinement pending a judicial

commitment proceeding should be permitted only under the circumstances that would justify denial of bail in the criminal system: lack of any technique for otherwise assuring the respondent's appearance at the hearing or as the necessary means of
insuring that the respondent will not commit an overt act en-

dangering self or others in the interim.0 0
At the expiration of the preliminary temporary detention
period, the state should be required to provide counsel for every
person for whom longer commitment is contemplated. I propose,
in addition, that no further psychiatric interviewing or questioning be permitted until the respondent actually has spoken to
counsel. 10 If the respondent thereafter agrees to further psychiatric diagnostic procedures and counsel concurs, a presumptively
F.2d 54, 67 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700, 711 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1005 (1970); United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 726 (4th Cir.
1968); see also Thornton v. Corcoran, 132 U.S. App. D.C. 232, 248, 407 F.2d 695, 711
(1969) (Burger, J., dissenting). Contra, Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1979).
209. But see note 16 supra, second paragraph.
210. Miranda and many subsequent cases have recognized the intimate connection
between the right to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination. In addition,
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967), recognized the constitutional magnitude
of the right to counsel at a "critical confrontation", the outcome of which might greatly
affect a criminal defendant's chances to prevail at trial. Accord, Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 398 (1977).
In part on the basis of Miranda, the Fifth Circuit held in Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d
694, 709 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nor. Estelle v. Smith, 445 U.S. 926 (1980),
that a criminal defendant facing a psychiatric examination has a right to counsel. The
court did not require the presence of counsel at the interview, but said that the defendant was entitled to counsel's assistance in deciding whether to submit to the interview.
602 F.2d at 708-09 ("This is a vitally important decision . . . . It is a difficult decision
even for an attorney; it requires a knowledge of what other evidence is available, of the
particular psychiatrist's biases and predelictions, [and] of possible alternative strategies. . ."). Although the Smith decision may have depended, in part, on the circumstance that Smith was facing the death penalty and the psychiatrist's later testimony
was critical to the sentencing decision, id. at 697-98, the Court's language suggests a
broader rule. See note 134 supra and accompanying text. But see Larsen v. Illinois, 74
Ill. 2d 348, 385 N.E.2d 679, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 908 (no right to counsel at pretrial
psychiatric examination).
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valid waiver will have taken place. Statements and diagnoses
thus obtained may be admitted into evidence without violation
of the privilege against self-incrimination.1 If the respondent
refuses diagnostic or treatment procedures after consulting with
counsel, such procedures should be prohibited. Should the respondent agree to such procedures but counsel object, the
mental health professionals should be allowed to proceed, but
with the understanding that a court might later find the respondent's "waiver" invalid because of lack of capacity. In brief,
there should be a presumption in favor of the validity of a
waiver when given with concurrence of counsel, but a presumption against validity if counsel objected.
The Miranda opinion declared a strong presumption
against waiver of the privilege by a suspected criminal; surely an
even stronger presumption should be found for mental health
respondents. A respondent in a commitment proceeding is significantly more likely than an accused criminal to be suffering
from some disorientation or thought disturbance that makes it
difficult to understand the dangers of cooperation. In addition, a
respondent may be faced with a practical "Catch-22." A respondent may believe, correctly in many cases, that the only hope of
release lies in talking to an examiner until the examiner is persuaded the respondent is not mentally ill. This strategy is likely
to provide the examiner with the very evidence needed to conclude the respondent is indeed mentally ill.
Requiring the presence of a lawyer before a valid waiver
may be made eliminates the necessity for examiners to attempt
to "warn" respondents of their rights in the way that police officers "warn" their suspects. Eliminating this requirement during the temporary detention period should be welcome to those
mental health professionals who have inveighed against procedural requirements they view as inconsistent with the relationship
they strive to establish with their patients.1 2 Mental health professionals may equally resent what they consider the untimely
211. It may be difficult for a psychiatrist who evaluates and treats a respondent
both during and after the crisis-intervention period to separate the impressions received
and opinions formed during the initial period from those received and formed later (after
the respondent waives the privilege against self-incrimination). It may be that the only
solution to this practical difficulty that fully protects the confidentiality of the respondent's earlier statements is a functional separation between those professionals who deal
with the respondent during the initial period and those who evaluate the respondent
later.
212. See, e.g., Treffert, Dying With Their Rights On, 130 AM. J. PsYcH. 1041
(1973) (letter to the editor); Slovenko, supra note 7. See also note 182 supra.
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appearance of the lawyer at the end of the period, " ' but it is
less clear that this resentment is justified. Requiring the psychiatrist to behave as a police officer requires a distortion of the
helping role for which psychiatrists are trained. Subjecting the
psychiatrist's advice and influence to legal scrutiny does not require any professional role distortion. Moreover, the participation of the lawyer in the therapeutic process, once it has become
in fact adversarial, is necessary to the protection of the rights of
the respondent and appropriate to a process that may culminate
in involuntary confinement. " "
B.

The Commitment Hearing

At the commitment hearing, not all aspects of the self-incrimination rights of a respondent need be as elaborate as the
corresponding rights of an accused in a criminal trial.. For example, the rule in criminal trials that the pre-trial silence of an accused may not be the subject of comment grew out of due process notions. It is unfair to advise an accused that silence will
incur no penalty and then to penalize that silence by comment
at trial. 15 Since under my proposal no such representation is
made to the mental health respondent, there is no due process
objection to testimony that recounts the respondent's refusal to
cooperate with an examiner.21
Whether the state should be permitted to call a respondent
to the stand in a commitment hearing is a more difficult question. On the one hand, it is clear that a state's attorney handling
the commitment has a strong interest in exhibiting the respondent to the jury. This interest is akin to the interest of a criminal prosecutor who wants the jury to see, for example, how
closely a defendant resembles a photograph taken of the perpetrator at the scene of the crime. That is, the state's attorney
wants the fact finder to observe the respondent's nonverbal or
nontestimonial behavior, such as how the respondent sits,
213. See Rapaport, supra note 199.
214. It is already a universal practice to afford a mental health respondent a right
to counsel at the commitment hearing, see notes 4 and 6 supra. Hence mental health
professionals already have accommodated themselves to the notion that lawyers have an
important role in the obviously adversary stages of the commitment process. My proposal advocates only that the right to counsel attach at an earlier stage than trial, as it does
in the criminal context. See note 210 supra.
215. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
216. In any event, such an account is unlikely to make much of an impression on a
fact finder. The inference of mental illness or dangerousness from silence is much less
strong than the inference of criminal guilt from silence.
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moves, speaks, and gestures. Such a use of the respondent is
consistent with the Schmerber limitation of the privilege to "testimonial" evidence. 17 On the other hand, testifying in court is
by definition a testimonial contribution from the respondent.
The task of limiting, by objections and other trial techniques,
the respondent's performance on the stand to the exhibition of
nontestimonial characteristics would seem to be impossible.218
In summary, the hearing should be structured to protect the
respondent's privilege to refuse to testify. This need not be onerous to the state, which can arrange for the factfinder's observation of the nontestimonial characteristics of the respondent. 1
The privilege against self-incrimination that I urge the courts to
recognize will not destroy the civil commitment system. As I
have argued, it may increase the number of consensual resolutions of mental health matters.20 It will not prevent the commitment of persons whose behavior is so overtly disturbed that
no psychiatric interview evidence is necessary 22 1 to enable a
court to make a conscientious finding that the standards for
222
commitment have been met by clear and convincing evidence.
217. See notes 30-38 supra and accompanying text.
218. Perhaps the varying interests could be accommodated merely by arranging the
hearing room so that the fact finder has a clear view of the respondent and can observe
his or her reactions to the hearing but cannot overhear any comments made by the
respondent.
It should be forbidden as it is in criminal trials for the state's attorney to comment
on, or for the judge to instruct on, the respondent's decision not to testify at trial. On the
other hand, perhaps the respondent's attempts to hide a physical characteristic, such as
trembling hands, should be a legitimate subject for prosecutorial comment. But cf.
Walker v. Butterworth, 599 F.2d 1074 (1st Cir. 1979), in which the court voided, on selfincrimination grounds, the conviction of a defendant who had been required at his trial
to conform to a Massachusetts rule on peremptory challenges. The Massachusetts rule
requires defendants in murder cases to exercise their peremptory challenges personally,
by identifying verbally the jurors whom they wish stricken. The defendant had entered a
plea of insanity, and the prosecutor argued at closing that the defendant's participation
in the challenge ritual was evidence of his rationality. Although agreeing that not all
forced utterances violate the privilege, the court held that this cooperation was testimonial, because it revealed something about the defendant's mental processes to the jurors.
Moreover, the court said, the implicit communication of rationality might well be misleading because the defendant was acting under compulsion; and "prohibiting the inherent unreliability of forced communication is an important policy reflected in the privilege
against self-incrimination." Id. at 1082 n.9.
219. An important issue not addressed here-concerns the propriety of medicating
the respondent so that he or she presents a different aspect at the hearing than when
unmedicated. A similar issue is presented in some criminal cases, see Winick, Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION Ras. J. 769.
220. See text accompanying note 198 supra.
221. See text accompanying note 142 supra.
222. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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On the other hand, there will probably be some persons who
could be committed with the aid of psychiatric testimony, but
who will refuse to cooperate and may escape commitment under
the scheme I have proposed. The social cost of this result will
not necessarily be great; persons whose underlying disturbance
can only be discovered by psychiatric examination are unlikely
to be those most in need of psychiatric attention or those who
pose the greatest danger to their communities. 2 8
IV.

A.

CONCLUSION

The Explanations

Few courts have been receptive to the argument that a respondent facing civil commitment should be afforded protection
from the evidentiary use of his own statements or testimony derived from a psychiatric examination. Some courts have explained their reluctance to apply the privilege against self-incrimination on the ground that the evidence contributed by the
respondent is not testimonial. I have argued that this explanation overlooks important values, principally reliability and
mental privacy, that the privilege was fashioned to protect.
Other courts hold that waiver is the explanation for the respondent's inability to invoke the exclusionary rule to exclude the
psychiatric testimony; but that explanation is seriously flawed
unless the respondent initiates a "battle of the experts" by
presenting psychiatric testimony. The third explanation, and the
one that commands the most respect, is that criminal procedural
protections-such as the privilege against self-incrimination-have no application in civil proceedings like mental health
hearings. This explanation, however, ignores the extent to which
the United States Supreme Court has recognized that protections analogous to those afforded the criminal accused may be
necessary in civil proceedings that may result in loss of liberty. I
have proposed a constellation of rules for the protection of the
self-incrimination privilege of mental health respondents that is
consistent with the civil and therapeutic nature of such proceedings and yet preserves the rights of respondents to privacy and
223. The unreliability of psychiatric diagnosis is discussed in ZISKIN, supra note 65,
at 120-28; and Ennis & Litwack, supra note 67. See also Amicus Curiae Brief for American Psychiatric Association, at 10-11, Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
granted sub noma. Estelle v. Smith, 445 U.S. 926 (1980) (predictions of dangerousness do
"not involve medical analysis" and are "not within the realm of established psychiatric
expertise").
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to the exclusion of unreliable evidence.
B.

The Proposal

Short-term detention of those for whom there is probable
cause to believe that the criteria for civil commitment are satisfied should be permissible, and there should be no prohibition
against the questioning or examination of candidates for*commitment during the short-term detention period. Moreover,
there should be no requirement that Miranda-like warnings be
administered during this period. Many crises may be resolved
during this period in a manner acceptable to both the respondent and the responsible mental health professional. If no such
resolution is possible, the respondent should be afforded counsel, and should rebuttably be presumed to be incapable of making a valid waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination in
the absence of his counsel's advice and concurrence. Finally, the
respondent should be privileged to decline to testify at the com"
mitment hearing.
It may be objected that the proposal outlined here permits
too much psychiatric inquiry, and that the protections afforded
to criminal suspects, including early Miranda-type warnings,
should be required. Any proposed constitutional reform, however, that severely interferes with the formation of a nonadversarial therapeutic relationship between a possibly disturbed person and a professional mental health worker seems doomed to
judicial rejection. The Court's recent inclination to accept the
therapeutic claims of mental health institutions, coupled with its
economy-minded enthusiasm for measures that reduce the need
for judicial resolution of disputes,2 ' militate against any such
reform.
It is true that prospects for psychiatric invasion of privacy
are greater in this proposed scheme than they would be were the
adversary relationship officially established at once, by requiring
that prospective respondents be warned immediately concerning
the adversary nature of eventual proceedings. For some, the fact
that respondents may be tricked, lulled, or persuaded to cooperate with a psychiatric inquiry into their mental processes, despite the fact that evidence gained thereby will not be admissible at a later hearing, establishes the potential for intolerable
224.

See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). The Court held plea-

bargaining for lower sentences constitutional and observed that "with the avoidance of
trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved." Id. at 752.
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invasions of privacy. This potential is troubling, but a rule treating any therapeutic contact as though it were a custodial interrogation would go too far, for it would prohibit a prison chaplain
from offering counselling to a convict, a school psychologist from
calling a student in for a conference, and a mental health worker
from engaging in therapy with a voluntary patient, in the absence of some kind of warning about the subject's right to remain silent.2 s Those cases ought to be distinguished because cooperation there poses no risk of eventual or prolonged
confinement.
The privacy justification for recognizing a right to refuse to
cooperate in a psychiatric inquiry is heightened when the prospect of a term of involuntary confinement looms and the results
of the inquiry may make that confinement more likely. Another
way of expressing this notion is that the privilege against selfincrimination has certain right-to-privacy characteristics, but it
draws independent strength from its place in the constellation of
rights enjoyed by those whose freedom the state seeks to take
away. Therefore, the privilege against self-incrimination should
be observed in civil commitment proceedings because a refusal
to recognize it impairs individual interests in both privacy and
liberty.
Of course, it might be objected that such recognition impermissibly interferes with the proper performance of the state's
duty to treat its mentally ill citizens. This proposal, however,
gives mental health professionals a significant opportunity to try
to persuade a person facing involuntary commitment to submit
voluntarily to some sort of treatment plan. This opportunity is
greater than any existing previously because examiners may
truthfully assure respondents during the initial temporary detention period that they seek only to work out an acceptable voluntary plan; examiners need not devote any energy or thought
to building a case against a respondent. Only when efforts at a
mutually acceptable solution fail, and the process does turn
truly adversary, would the law begin to interfere with the ideal
therapeutic progress of the case.
Precisely at this point, of course, the objections of psychiatric professionals begin. Mental health workers do not want lawyers injected into the commitment process. Yet those professionals must recognize that by creating the machinery for civil
225. My proposal would, of course, not countenance the imposition of sanctions on
a noncooperating subject in any of the described situations.
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commitment, the law does something extraordinary. It gives
mental health professionals a power they would not otherwise
enjoy, the power to treat nonconsenting individuals. Since it is
the law that confers this enormous power, mental health professionals cannot becomingly protest that the "legal" aspects of the
procedure have become onerous. The fact is that mental health
professionals do seek a resolution antagonistic to a respondent's
expressed desires when those professionals seek involuntary
commitment. The law merely recognizes this when it offers respondents the privilege of refusing to cooperate in their own
confinement, however therapeutic that confinement is intended
or ultimately may prove to be. Prison has sometimes been therapeutic; so has juvenile reform school. The state must, however,
make its way through proceedings designed to relegate individuals to those places without the involuntary or unwitting testimonial assistance of the individuals themselves. Those facing involuntary confinement for mental illness are entitled to at least as
much protection.

